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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's March 3, 1997 decision in Warner-
Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.' is a major step
forward in bringing greater certainty to the difficult process of deter-
mining the proper scope of protection for patents. Unlike prior
landmark decisions on this subject, Warner-Jenkinson was a unani-
mous decision, which enhances its potential for stabilizing the law.
However, the decision not only fails to solve all existing problems
within the law of patent infringement, but also raises some new
questions that only subsequent developments in case law can answer.
Recognizing the interest of existing patent owners in a fair scope
of protection, the Supreme Court declined to "speak the death" of
the "doctrine of equivalents," 2 which has been applied by the courts
since 1853, and confirmed by the Court in the 1950 Graver Tank de-
cision. Under the doctrine, a "product or process that does not liter-
ally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonethe-
less be found to infringe if there is 'equivalence' between the
elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements
of the patented invention."' 4 Abolishing the doctrine or limiting it se-
verely by confining it to equivalents known at the time a patent is-
sues, or by confining it to cases of intentional infringement, or by ap-
plying a rigid rule of estoppel whenever the patentee amended a
claim might provide "brighter lines" in determining infringement,
but would "change so substantially the rules of the game" as to
"subvert the various balances the PTO [Patent and Trademark Of-
fice] sought to strike when issuing the numerous patents which have
not yet expired .... '-5 Instead, the Court adopted an objective test of
equivalency that is applied to each claim element, leaving to the Fed-
eral Circuit the task of developing the linguistic framework of
equivalency.6
On the other hand, the Supreme Court acknowledged concerns
that the doctrine of equivalents "has taken on a life of its own" and
"when applied, broadly conflicts with the definitional and public-
1. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. CL 1040 (1997).
2. Id. at 1045.
3. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950); see 5
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 18.04 (1997).
4. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. at 1045.
5. Id. at 1050.
6. Id. at 1054.
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notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement."' 7 To address
these concerns, the Court adopted an element-by-element approach to
the doctrine of equivalents as opposed to the overall approach previ-
ously administered by the Court.8 The decision emphasized that
courts should exercise "a special vigilance against allowing the con-
cept of equivalence to eliminate completely any such elements." 9
Warner-Jenkinson also confmned "prosecution history estoppel" as
a limitation on equivalency. 0 Although estoppel is not governed by a
rigid rule precluding equivalency, whenever a claim is amended
during prosecution there is a presumption that the amendment was
made because an issue related to patentability existed. This pre-
sumption is rebutted if a patentee shows "an appropriate reason for a
required amendment.""1
The Warner-Jenkinson decision does not resolve the issue re-
garding the role of juries in determining equivalency. The Supreme
Court merely notes that there is ample authority supporting the Fed-
eral Circuit decision which states that disputed fact issues on equiva-
lency are for resolution by a jury.12 But the Court does offer guid-
ance on how to reduce concerns about unreviewability due to "black
box jury verdicts."' 3 First and foremost, the limitations on equiva-
lency, including prosecution history estoppel and whether the pat-
entee's theory of equivalency would vitiate a claim element, are for
resolution by the court presiding over the case.' 4 However, the Su-
preme Court encourages the Federal Circuit to "implement proce-
dural improvements to promote certainty, consistency, and review-
ability to this area of the law."' 5  Procedures for sifting out
unsupported or inappropriate charges of infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents should work in tandem with the procedures al-
ready being developed in the district courts to implement the Su-
preme Court's earlier decision in Mark/man,16 which held that patent
claim construction is a question of law for resolution by a judge, not
7. Id. at 1048-49.
8. Id. at 1054.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see 5 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 18.05.
11. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. at 1051.
12. Id. at 1053.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1054.
15. Id.
16. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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a jury.
This article will review: (1) the history of the doctrine of
equivalents and the Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum, (2) the
schism that developed in the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit which led to the 1995 en banc decision in Hilton
Davis v. Warner-Jenkinson, (3) the facts of the Warner-Jenkinson
case, and (4) the Supreme Court's Warner-Jenkinson decision. In
addition, this article will assess the likely impact of the Supreme
Court's decision on issues concerning equivalency and estoppel,
which have been dealt with previously by the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. Included in this assessment are some critical
comments directed to the Federal Circuit's June 12, 1997 order in the
continuing Hilton-Davis litigation.
II. BACKGROUND: THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS AND THE FAIR
PROTECTION - CERTAINTY CONUNDRUM
The most important issue in intellectual property is the scope of
protection: given that an intellectual property right exists, to what
does it extend? This is true for all the species of intellectual property,
including copyright, trademark, trade secret and patent. For example,
granted that there is a trademark property interest in the mark
"McDonald's" for fast food restaurant services, what marks fall
within the scope of right: McDonnell for fast food? McDevitt?
Donald? If there were a current copyright on the play Romeo and
Juliet, what dramatic works would fall within its scope: all plays that
involve young lovers from warring families regardless of historical
epoch, including West Side Story?
In addressing the preeminently important scope of protection is-
sue, patent law is unique among intellectual rights 7 in that it has long
required the inventor to set forth a precise, fixed verbal definition of
the patented invention, the definition taking the form of a "claim." 8
In the United States, patent infringement is defined by statute as
the making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing of a pat-
ented invention in the United States during the term of the patent
17. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (patent claim as including specifications) with 17
U.S.C. § 409 (1994) (copyright registration) and 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994) (trademark registra-
tion).
18. See 3 CmSUM, supra note 3, § 8.02.
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without authority of the patent owner.19 Though the statute does not
expressly so state, the "patented invention" is determined by refer-
ence to the claims of the patent. This is a natural inference from the
statutory requirement that the specification of the patent "conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his inven-
tion." 20
That the claims of a patent should be clear and should control
the determination of infringement has been emphasized by the Su-
preme Court for over a century.21 In an 1877 decision, for example,
the Court stressed that "nothing can be more just and fair both to the
patentee and to the public, than that the former should understand and
correctly describe just what he has invented and for what he claims a
patent."22
Although the courts have consistently recognized the importance
of clear claiming, they have also been unwilling to confine patentees
to the strict literal wording of their claims and have found infringe-
ment under some circumstances when an accused infringer has
adopted an equivalent structure or process.23 This willingness to ex-
tend the scope of a patent beyond the literal language of the patent
claims is known as the doctrine of equivalents. Judge Learned Hand
referred to the doctrine as an anomaly:
[A]fter all aids to interpretation have been exhausted, and the
scope of the claims has been enlarged as far as the words can be
stretched, on proper occasions courts make them cover more than
their meaning will bear. If they applied the law with inexorable ri-
gidity, they would never do this, but would remit the patentee to
his remedy of re-issue, and that is exactly what they frequently do.
Not always, however, for at times they resort to the "doctrine of
equivalents" to temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer
from stealing the benefit of the invention. No doubt, this is,
strictly speaking, an anomaly; but it is one which courts have
frankly faced and accepted almost from the beginning.24
Underlying the anomalous doctrine of equivalents and the re-
19. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
21. See generally 3 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 8.02[3].
22. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1877).
23. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 18.02.
24. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948).
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lated doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is a policy dilemma.
To coin a phrase, this dilemma can be termed as the "Fair Protection-
Certainty Conundrum," which is inherent in any patent system that
requires a fixed, written description of the invention (i.e., a "claim").
There is clearly an interest in providing a clear definition of the scope
of the patent right; lack of clarity can impede legitimate investment
in technology-based products and services. On the other hand, strict
and literal adherence to the written claim in determining the scope of
protection can invite subversion of a valuable right and substantially
diminish the economic value of patents. Claims are often written by
people with limited resources and time, imperfect expression skills,
and incomplete understandings of the invention, the prior art that de-
termines its patentability, and the forms in which it may later be cast.
The Conundrum was most clearly and directly confronted in
Europe in the 1970s during the process of harmonizing the patent
laws of the European nations. Traditionally, the United Kingdom fo-
cused heavily on claim language while Germany emphasized the na-
ture of the underlying invention.2s Reconciling these views was a
considerable problem in drafting the European Patent Convention.26
Article 69 of the Convention provides that the "extent of the protec-
tion conferred by a European patent.., shall be determined by the
terms of the claims" and that "[n]evertheless, the description and
drawings shall be used to interpret the claims. ' 27 The parties adopted
a "Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the Convention,"
which states the following:
Article 69 should not be interpreted in the sense that the extent of
the protection conferred by a European patent is to be understood
as that defined by the strict literal meaning of the wording used in
the claim, the description and drawings being employed only for
the purpose of resolving an ambiguity found in the claims. Neither
should it be interpreted in the sense that the claims serve only as a
guideline and that the actual protection conferred may extend to
what, from a consideration of the description and drawings by a
person skilled in the art, the patentee has contemplated. On the
contrary, it is to be interpreted as defining a position between these
25. See 5 CHIsUM, supra note 3, § 18.02.
26. Convention on the Grant of European Patents as amended, Dec. 21, 1978, European
Community.
27. Id. at Art. 69.
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extremes which combines a fair protection for the patentee with a
reasonable degree of certainty for third parties.28
Article 69 and its Protocol address claim interpretation rather
than the doctrine of equivalents. But the Protocol's goal of combin-
ing "a fair protection for the patentee with a reasonable degree of
certainty for third parties" is the same goal the better-reasoned court
decisions in the United States have sought to achieve.
A. Supreme Court Decisions Prior to 1997
Numerous United States Supreme Court decisions before War-
ner-Jenkinson discussed and applied the concept of infringement by
equivalency.29 However, two decisions, handed down almost a cen-
tury apart, are of primary importance: Winans v. Denmead3o (1853),
the first major pronouncement on equivalency by the Court, and
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air iroducts31 (1950), the leading
modem decision and the last pronouncement prior to Warner-
Jenkinson. Both decisions are cited and quoted in Warner-Jenkinson.
1. Winans v. Denmead
Winans was the first Supreme Court decision to use the doctrine
of equivalents to do serious damage to the literal meaning of patent
claim language. Mr. Winans' patent was for a new type of railroad
car to carry coal.32 Prior to Winans' invention, railroad cars were
constructed with a rectangular floor plan. Winans perceived that the
dispersion of the force of the coal in such a car was uneven, thus re-
quiring substantial reinforcement. He designed a conically-shaped
car which evenly distributed the pressure of the coal and facilitated
its discharge through an aperture in the bottom. This shape of the car
enabled the patentee to build cars with a much greater load weight as
compared to the weight of the car.33 In his patent, Winans stated the
28. Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the Convention on the Grant of Euro-
pean Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, European Community.
29. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908);
Morley Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263 (1889).
30. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
31. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). For a thor-
ough scholarly review of the Graver Tank decision and its commercial and technological im-
plications, see Paul M. Janicke, Heat of Passion: What Really Happened in Graver Tank, 24
AiPLAQJ. 1 (1996).
32. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
33. Id. at 343.
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following claim:
What I claim as my invention, and desire to secure by letters-
patent, is making the body of a car for the transportation of coal,
&c., [sic] in the form of a frustum of a cone, substantially as herein
described, whereby the force exerted by the weight of the load
presses equally in all directions, and does not tend to change the
form thereof, so that every part resists its equal proportion, and by
which, also, the lower part is so reduced as to pass down within the
truck frame and between the axles, to lower the center of gravity
of the load without diminishing the capacity of the car as de-
scribed.34
The defendant constructed railroad cars that were "octagonal
and pyramidal" in shape, rather than "cylindrical and conical" as
provided in Winans' patent.3 In the infringement suit, all the evi-
dence indicated that the defendant's car achieved substantially all the
advantages of the Winans car.36 It also indicated that the plaintiff and
defendant were competitors and that the defendant's design was di-
rectly inspired by the plaintiff's product. Nevertheless, the trial judge
instructed the jury that there could be no infringement since the de-
fendant's car was rectilinear and the patent claim required a conical
shape. 37
A sharply divided Supreme Court reversed. For the majority,
Justice Curtis relied on a presumption that the patentee claimed all
that he was entitled to claim. He noted that it would be unreasonable
to apply the term "cone" literally, because "neither the patentee nor
any other constructor has made, or will make, a car exactly circu-
lar. '' 38 Reasonably interpreted, the claim required only that the car
"be so near to a true circle as substantially to embody the patentee's
mode of operation, and thereby attain the same kind of result as was
reached by his invention. ' 39
Four justices dissented in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Taney, who emphasized that the patentee confined his claim to the
conical form and may have been "unwilling to expose the validity of
34. Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 343.
36. Id. at 340.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 343-44.
39. Id.
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his patent, by the assertion of a right to any other."' 40 The Patent Act
required patentees to "specify and point out" what they claim as an
invention. Requiring less than precision and particularity in claims
would be "mischievous" and "productive of oppressive and costly
litigation, of exorbitant and unjust pretensions and vexatious de-
mands." 41
The judicial debate in Winans has a remarkably contemporary
tone. The two sides felt the full force of the Fair Protection-Certainty
Conundrum.
2. Graver Tank & Mfg.Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co.
Graver Tank involved a patent claiming a flux for electric
welding.42 The specification of the patent stated that the inyentors
had used calcium silicate and silicates of sodium, barium, iron, man-
ganese, cobalt, magnesium, nickel and aluminum. 43 It stated a pref-
erence for silicates of the alkaline earth metals (which include cal-
cium, magnesium, barium, and an unlisted species - strontium). 44
One set of claims described the key element generically as "silicate"
or "metallic silicate. '45 This set of claims was held invalid. 46 The
basis for this ruling was that the claim included numerous embodi-
ments that were inoperative as fluxes.47 The Supreme Court affirmed
the district court's ruling that the claim could not be narrowed by
construction to the nine specific metallic silicates listed in the speci-
fication.4 A second set of claims were for fluxes containing an
"alkaline earth metal silicate. '49 This set of claims was held valid.50
The patent owner used for its commercial embodiment
40. Id. at 347.
41. Id.
42. Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 86 F.Supp 191 (1950).
43. Id. at 197.
44. Alkaline earth metals are metals whose oxides are alkaline earths. These bivalent
metals are found in Group HA of the periodic table. Radium is often not on the list of such
metals, because its chemical properties do not track as closely as those of the others, i.e. beryl-
lium, magnesium, calcium, strontium and barium. Calcium and beryllium occur naturally as
complex silicates. The others occur naturally as phosphates, sulfates and carbonates.
45. Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 86 F.Supp 191, 197-198 (1950).
46. Id. at 198.
47. Id. at 198-199.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 198.
50. Id.
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("Uniomnelt") a silicate of magnesium, which is an alkaline earth
metal silicate. The accused infringer used for its commercial em-
bodiment ("Lincolnweld") a silicate of manganese, which is a me-
tallic silicate but not an alkaline earth metal silicate.51 Consequently,
the claims held valid were not literally infringed.52
An important point (and one that may have strengthened the pat-
entee's equities in the minds of the majority in Graver Tank) was that
the infringer's product used a species actually disclosed in the pat-
entee's specification, a species that was literally covered by generic
claims that were held invalid only because of undue breadth. The re-
ported opinions in Graver Tank do not indicate why the patentee
failed to claim specifically the alternative embodiment with a silicate
of manganese. One reason may well have been that at the time of
Graver Tank, Patent Office policy restricted an inventor to no more
than three species claims if a claim to a genus were allowed. (This
was liberalized to five in 1949 and to a "reasonable number" in
1978).53
Despite the absence of literal infringement of the valid claims,
the Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the trial court that there
was infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.5 4 Expert testi-
mony indicated that manganese and magnesium serve the same pur-
pose in fluxes. Prior art patents taught the use of manganese in
welding fluxes.55
The Court noted the origin of the doctrine in Winans and stated
that the doctrine "continues today ready and available for utilization
when the proper circumstances for its application arise."' 56 Also, the
Court quoted Judge Hand's opinions in Royal Typewriter and Sani-
tary Refrigerator for the proposition that "a patentee may invoke this
doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device if it performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to ob-
tain the same result."' 57 This latter phrasing has come to be known as
the "triple identity" test.
The Court made the following points about the doctrine of
51. Id. at 199.
52. Id.
53. See 4 CHIsuM, supra note 3, § 12.02[2][e].
54. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 612 (1950).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 608.
57. Id. at 608-9 n.I.
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equivalents:
1. The doctrine is based on the notion that "one may not practice
a fraud on a patent."
2. The doctrine operates not only in favor of the patentee of a
pioneer invention but also in favor of secondary inventions
that produce new and useful results (though the area of
equivalency may vary under the circumstances).
3. The doctrine may be used against, as well as in favor of, a
patentee in situations in which an accused device falls within
the literal words of the claims but performs the same or a
similar function in a substantially different way.
4. Equivalency is not determined by any particular formula but
rather must be determined against the context of the patent,
the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case.
5. Complete identity for every purpose and in every respect is
not required.
6. Things that are equal to the same thing may not be equal to
each other; things for most purposes different may sometimes
be equivalents to each other.
7. Consideration must be given to the purpose for which an in-
gredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined
with other ingredients, and the function which it is intended to
perform.
8. An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in
the art would have known of the interchangeability of an in-
gredient that was not included in the patent with one that was
so included.
9. Equivalency is a determination of fact and may be proved by
the testimony of experts, by documents, by texts and treatises,
and by the disclosures of the prior art.58
In affirming the trial court finding of equivalency, the Court
noted the absence of evidence that the accused infringer had devel-
oped the accused process independently.59
58. Id. at 608-9.
59. Id. at 612.
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Graver Tank became a key judicial precedent, primarily because
the Supreme Court did not return to the subject for nearly 50 years.
Overall, the Court's opinion is weak because of its one-sidedness: it
focuses almost exclusively on the fair protection side of the Fair
Protection-Certainty Conundrum. It also contains analytic flaws. For
example, it stated that "to permit imitation of a patented invention
which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the pro-
tection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing" 6 and that
"[o]utright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of
infringement. " 61 These statements equate patent infringement stan-
dards with those standards used in copyright law, but this overlooks
the fact that provisions for claims do not exist in copyright law.
There are numerous instances of broad patent claims to fundamental
technologies that have been or would be literally infringed - even
by implementations that differ from the specific ones devised and
disclosed in the patent.
An important aspect of the 1997 Warner-Jenkinson decision is
that the Supreme Court restored balance to the law of patent claim
scope; it brought the Conundrum, which can be masked but not
eradicated, back into the open.
B. Federal Circuit Reassessment Leading to Hilton Davis
In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and conferred on it exclusive appellate jurisdiction over ap-
peals from district court judgments in patent infringement suits. This
made the decisions by the Federal Circuit of great significance in
patent law. The Federal Circuit's decisions are subject to discretion-
ary review by the Supreme Court, but this has occurred only rarely
over the past 15 years. In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court ex-
pressly recognized the expertise and responsibility of the Federal
Circuit to develop and apply the principles of patent law.62
Appeals to the Federal Circuit are heard panels of three judges.
Under the court's practice, a panel is bound to follow the decisions of
previous panels of the Federal Circuit (and of the Federal Circuit's
two predecessor courts, the Court of Claims and the Court of Cus-
60. Id. at 607.
61. Id.
62. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
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toms and Patent Appeals).6 3 However, significant divergence among
Federal Circuit panel decisions has occurred. The Federal Circuit
may seek to resolve any such splits or questions of exceptional im-
portance by hearing a case en bane, that is, with all of the active
judges participating.
The Federal Circuit first addressed the important issues of the
doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel in the 1983
Hughes Aircraft decision. It soon became clear that judges on the
court held differing views about how to resolve difficult questions
concerning patent claim scope, or in other words, about how to ad-
dress the Conundrum. The Federal Circuit rendered en bane deci-
sions in SRI International6s (1984) and in Pennwalt16 (1987). The
cases produced multiple dissenting and concurring opinions. It was
evident that the court had not reached a comfortable consensus.
Reassessment of the doctrine of equivalents in the 1995 Hilton
Davis case occurred because Federal Circuit panel decisions after
1987 developed two separate schools of thought about the doctrine.
One school leaned toward fair protection; the other toward clear no-
tice. Each found support in the language of the Graver Tank opinion.
The first school held that:
1. The doctrine was a "second prong" for determining infringe-
ment, if literal infringement was absent, then the doctrine was po-
tentially available in every case unless restricted by prosecution
history estoppel or the prior art;
2. The test for equivalency was whether the accused product or
process performed the same function, way, and result as the
claimed invention (the "triple identity" test); and
63. E.g., UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
64. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Begun in
1973, the Hughes litigation over a patent claiming an orbiting satellite has stretched on for
decades. In a recent panel decision dealing with the case's proof of damages phase, the judges
discussed whether the Hughes interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents had been under-
mined by later Federal Circuit decisions. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566
(Fed. Cir. 1996). After Wamer-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court remanded Hughes for further
consideration. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1466. The case goes onl
65. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (The
11 participating judges voted as follow: five joined one opinion, five joined an opposing
opinion, the eleventh took a middle position in a concurring opinion).
66. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 93 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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3. A genuine dispute between a patentee and accused infringer
over whether the accused product or process met the triple identity
test was resolvable as a question of fact by a jury if one party
properly demanded trial by jury.67
The second school held that:
1. The doctrine applied only in "exceptional cases;"
2. The triple identity result was not the exclusive test but rather
was supplemented by other "equitable" factors, including whether
the accused infringer knew of and copied the patented invention,
which favors finding equivalency, or developed the accused prod-
uct or process independently, which favors finding no equiva-
lency; and
3. The judge must determine whether the equitable "threshold" for
applying the doctrine and extending the patent's claims beyond
their literal scope has been established, either before or after sub-
mitting any factual issues on equivalency to the jury.68
The triple identity test itself came under scrutiny. The test's ab-
stract character diminished its value as an objective determinant of
equivalency. In litigation, patentees characterize the way, function
and result broadly to show similarity between the patented invention
and the accused product; accused infringers characterize them nar-
rowly to show substantial differences. 69 In concurring opinions,
Judge Lourie criticized the triple identity test, referred to as "FWR,"
as inadequate, especially when directed to chemical compounds, be-
cause it focuses on function even though the claimed invention is a
structure (very different structures can perform the same function in
the same way to achieve the same result). 70
67. See, e.g., Miles Lab., Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Read
Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing,
Inc., 872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
68. Int'l Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Lourie,
concurring); Charles Greiner & Co. v. Marl-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Cf. Perkin-Elmer Corp.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Great N. Corp. v. Davis Core &
Pad Co., 782 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
69. In two decisions involving chemical or biochemical inventions, the court used the
prior art to reject a patentee's broad definition of function. See Genentech, Inc. v. The Well-
come Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
70. See Genentech, Inc. v. The Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Int'l Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Lourie, J., concur-
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C. The Hilton Davis - Warner-Jenkinson Patent Controversy:
What is "Approximately 6. 0 to 9. 0 pH"?
In Hilton Davis, a jury found infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents even though the accused process (1) was developed inde-
pendently and without knowledge of the patentee's work, and (2)
failed to meet a claim limitation requiring that a solution have a 6.0
pH, to an extent (5.0) that was an order of magnitude (i.e. ten-fold)
different in chemical terms.71
The Hilton Davis patent (No. 4,560,746) was for a process that
removed impurities from food and drug dyes (Red Dye #40 and Yel-
low Dye #6).72 In the prior art, dye manufacturers "used an expen-
sive and wasteful process known as 'salting out' to purify the dyes,"
whereas the patent disclosed an "ultrafiltration" process, which en-
tails using osmosis through a membrane.7
In 1982, the inventors, Hilton Davis employees Cook and
Rebhahn, investigated a membrane separation process, hiring Os-
monics, Inc., an equipment manufacturer, to test the membrane sepa-
ration process. 74 The August 1982 test failed.75 A second test in
ring). See also Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir,
1995) (en bane), rev'd& remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1996) (Lourie, J., dissenting).
71. The Supreme Court cited an encyclopedia's explanation of"pH":
The pH, or power (exponent) of Hydrogen, of a solution is a measure of its
acidity or alkalinity. A pH of 7.0 is neutral; a pH below 7.0 is acidic; and a pH
above 7.0 is alkaline. Although measurement of pH is on a logarithmic scale,
with each whole number difference representing a ten-fold difference in acidity,
the practical significance of any such difference will often depend on the con-
text. Pure water, for example, has a neutra ;)H of 7.0, whereas carbonated wa-
ter has an acidic pH of 3.0, and concentrated hydrochloric acid has a pH ap-
proaching 0.0. On the other end of the scale, milk of magnesia has a pH of
10.0, whereas household ammonia has a pH of 11.9. 21 Encyclopedia Ameri-
cana 844 (Int'l ed. 1990).
Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1045 n.1 (1997).
Later, on remand, the Federal Circuit gently corrected the Supreme Court's chemistry:
The significance of a change in pH depends on the context, as recognized by the
Supreme Court. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S.
Ct. at 1045 n.l. We observe, however, that the pH number is derived from hy-
drogen ion concentration, and a one unit change in pH states a ten-fold differ-
ence in hydrogen ion concentration, rather than literally indicating a ten-fold
difference in "acidity."
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
72. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1515 (Fed Cir.
1995) (en bane), rev'd and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1996).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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October 1982, with specified changes, succeeded.76 The inventors
filed an application and obtained a patent in 1985. 77 The patent's
Jepson format claim 1 provided:
In a process for the purification of a dye selected from the group
[including Red Dye #40 and Yellow Dye #6], the improvement
which comprises: subjecting an aqueous solution of the reaction
mixture resulting from said coupling or said sulfonation to ul-
trafiltration through a membrane having a nominal pore diameter
of 5-15 Angstroms under a hydrostatic pressure of approximately
200 to 400 p.s. i.g., at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0, to
thereby cause separation of said impurities from said dye, said im-
purities of a molecular size smaller than the nominal pore diameter
passing into the permeate on the downstream side of said mem-
brane and said dye remaining in the concentrate, and when sub-
stantially all said impurities have been removed from said concen-
trate, as evidenced by their essential absence in said permeate,
recovering said dye, in approximately 90% purity from said con-
centrate by evaporation of said concentrate to dryness. 78
The inventors added the limitation of "at a pH from approxi-
mately 6.0 to 9.0" during prosecution to distinguish the Booth patent,
which disclosed an ultrafiltration process that, among other differ-
ences from the claimed process, operated at a pH above 9.0 and pref-
erably between 11.0 and 13.0.9 As the Supreme Court later noted,
the reason for the lower limit of 6.0 was disputed. 0 In the patent's
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. The Booth patent, No. 4,189,380, concerned ultrafiltration of "aqueous solutions of
polymeric colorants." The patent claimed the improvement of adding to the solution salt
above about 1%. It indicated that it was "often of advantage" to add base material to maintain
the pH of the retentate "above 9, preferably from 11 to 13 during the period of salt mainte-
nance." U.S. Patent 4,189,380 to Booth, et al. Thus, the Booth patent seemed to involve dif-
ferent dyes from those in the Hilton Davis patent and used salt, which the Hilton Davis patent
sought to avoid.
80. The Supreme Court described the dispute as follows:
Petitioner contends that the lower limit was added because below a pH of 6.0
the patented process created "foaming" problems in the plant and because the
process was not shown to work below that pH level. Brief for Petitioner 4, n.5,
37, n.28. Respondent counters that the process was successfully tested to pH
levels as low as 2.2 with no effect on the process because of foaming, but offers
no particular explanation as to why the lower level of 6.0 pH was selected.
Resp't Br. 34, n.34. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S.
Ct. 1040, 1046 n.2 (1997).
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general description and examples, the 6.0 to 9.0 pH range was not de-
scribed as critical.8" The specification indicates that pH of the unfil-
tered reaction products is about 9.0 and indicates a preference to re-
duce the pH, preferably to about 6.0 to 8.0, which centers around the
neutral pH value of 7.12
In 1982, the accused infringer, Warner-Jenkinson, hired Os-
monics under a secrecy agreement to test a membrane separation
process on a dye solution that had already been salted out.s3 Osmon-
ics performed the test in August 1982, one week before the first Hil-
ton Davis test.4 The test failed. Warner Jenkinson ceased work on
Red Dye #40 and Yellow Dye #6 filtration until 1986. In 1986, War-
ner-Jenkinson developed the accused process, which included mem-
brane ultrafiltration. 5 After the patent issued, Hilton Davis sued for
infringement. 86 Hilton Davis' evidence showed that Warner-
Jenkinson's process operated at pressures somewhere in a range of
200 to nearly 500 p.s.i.g. and apH of 5.17
D. The Federal Circuit Hilton Davis Opinions
In Hilton Davis, the Federal Circuit heard the case en banc in
81. U.S. Patent 4,560,746 to Rebhan, et a.
82. The specification of the patent in suit, No. 4,560,746, describes a process in which,
first, a known reaction for making food dyes is carried out, and then the reaction product is
subjected to ultrafiltration through a membrane. The specification states the following:
In carrying out the present process the reaction mixture, as produced in the di-
azo coupling and as fed to the ultrafiltration unit, generally has pH ofapproxi-
mately 9.0. While these solutions can be subjected successfully to ultrafiltra-
tion, it is preferred to adjust the pH to approximately 6.0 to 8.0 before passage
through the ultrafiltration membrane.
Id. (emphasis added). The specification's discussion of pH is reflected in the patent's claims.
Claim I broadly claimed the process. Dependent claims 5 and 6 added the limitation that the
reaction mixture be "adjusted to 6.0 to 8.0 before ultrafiltation." The addition of the 6 to 9 pH
range to the independent claim created an awkward relationship to the dependent claims,
which suggests that the claim amendment may have resulted from a compromise between an
attorney and examiner, each of whom may have only imperfectly understood the nature of the
invention disclosed in the specification and its relationship to the prior art. Such imperfections
in claim drafting and prosecution are not uncommon, and a recurring issue with regard to the
doctrine of equivalents is whether courts can provide effective protection for the substance of
an invention despite flaws in the wording of the claims. See id.
83. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1515 (Fed Cir.
1995) (in bane), rev'd& remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1516.
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order to clarify its position on the doctrine of equivalents. The Fed-
eral Circuit voted 7 to 5 to affirm the verdict of infringement. The
majority indicated that the triple identity (FWR) test is not the sole
test of equivalency, adopting instead a "substantiality" standard,
otherwise rejecting the second school's views regarding an
"equitable threshold" to applying the doctrine of equivalents.8 1
Lengthy opinions were delivered by Judges Newman (concurring),
Plager (dissenting, joined by Chief Judge Archer and Judges Rich
and Lourie), Lourie (dissenting, joined by Judges Rich and Plager),
and Nies (dissenting, joined, as to some parts, by Chief Judge
Archer).
The majority upheld the jury's verdict of infringement, because
"one of skill in the art would know that performing ultrafiltration at a
pH of 5 would allow the membrane to perform the same function, in
an equivalent way, to achieve the same result as at a pH of approxi-
mately 6 to 9."89 The accused process' pH variation from the
claimed approximate range was insubstantial.90 The pH limitation
prevented damage to the membrane and produced a neutral final dye
product.91 An inventor testified that any pH above 2.0 would have
this effect. 92 The accused infringer's expert admitted the patented
process would operate at a 5.0 pH.9
In coming to its decision, the Federal Circuit clarified certain is-
sues regarding the doctrine of equivalents. First, the majority re-
jected the argument that the doctrine of equivalents had an equitable
or subjective component.94 A patentee need not prove bad faith or
intentional conduct by the accused infringer.9  Copying and
"designing around" may "inform the test for infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents." 96 "When an attempt to copy occurs, the
fact-finder may infer that the copyist, presumably one of some skill
in the art, has made a fair copy, with only insubstantial changes. ' 97
88. Id. at 1518, 1523.
89. Id. at 1524.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1519, 1524.
95. Id. at 1519.
96. Id.
97. Id.
20 COMPUTER & 1-fIGHTECHNOLOGYL4WJOUR1VAL [Vol. 14
"Designing around" may be evidence of a substantial difference. 98
Second, independent development by the accused infringer, which
the Supreme Court mentioned in Graver Tank, provides, as such, "no
information about the substantiality of the differences," but an ac-
cused infringer may rely on independent development to refute a pat-
entee's charge of copying.99 Third, the majority viewed "known in-
terchangeability," that is, the interchangeability of a claimed
ingredient and allegedly equivalent ingredient, as an important factor.
Without evidence of known interchangeability, to establish equiva-
lency the patentee must present "other objective technological evi-
dence" 00 to demonstrate that the change is one that a person of ordi-
nary skill in the art "would have considered insubstantial at the time
of infringement."' 0'°  Fourth, the majority rejected a dissenting
judge's argument that the doctrine of equivalents was limited to sub-
stitutions of components that were known to be equivalents when the
patent issued. 02
Finally, the majority held that the patentee's amendment adding
the 6.0 to 9.0 pH limitation did not estop it from claiming equiva-
lency for processes using a pH below 6.0. Since the purpose of the
amendment was to distinguish the Booth reference, which had a pH
above 9.0, it did "not bar [the patentee] from asserting equivalency to
processes such as [the accused infringer's] operating sometimes at a
pH below 6"103 because the amended lower limit was not due to prior
art.
98. Federal Circuit panel decisions after Hilton Davis found no infringement when the
facts showed that the accused infringer "designed around" the claimed invention rather copied
it. Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (The district court cor-
rectly found the "original" accused device infringing under the doctrine of equivalents but
clearly erred in finding the "redesign" accused device infringing. Substituting a prism align-
ment system for the claimed reticle alignment system in the patented interferometer "simply
can not be deemed an insubstantial change."); Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d
1112, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (The district court committed clear error in finding infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents; the accused infringer's design-around activities, which In-
cluded substantial changes "for a reason... provide[d] an inference of no infringement under
the doctrine" of equivalents).
99. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Waimer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1515, 1520 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
100. Id. at 1519.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Idat 1519.
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I. WARWER-JENKMSON
The Supreme Court granted Warner-Jenkinson's petition for a
writ of certiorari. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings in the
Federal Circuit in view of the "requirements as described by us to-
day, particularly as related to prosecution history estoppel and the
preservation of some meaning for each element in a claim." 
'
0
4
A. Survival of the Doctrine of Equivalents under the 1952
Patent Act
The Court reviewed the 1950 Graver Tank decision and its de-
scription of "some of the considerations that go into applying the
doctrine of equivalents."105
The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the 1952 Pat-
ent Act implicitly abrogated the doctrine of equivalents. 0 6 The Act's
claiming, examination, and reissue provisions were "not materially
different from the 1870 Act"'10 7 and Graver Tank, over dissents, re-
jected arguments for abolition of the doctrine based on those provi-
sions.108 Indeed, similar arguments were rejected a century earlier in
Winans.109 Any minor differences between the 1870 and 1952 Acts
"have no bearing on the result reached in Graver Tank, and thus pro-
vide no basis for our overruling it."110
The 1952 Act's reference to equivalency in paragraph 6 of
§ 112, on the interpretation of means-plus-function limitations, was
new. The petitioner argued that "the doctrine [of equivalents] was
implicitly rejected as a general matter by Congress' specific and lim-
ited inclusion of the doctrine in one section regarding 'means'
104. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1054 (1997).
105. Id. at 1047.
106. Id.
107. Id In fact, the 1952 Act did make significant changes to the reissue procedure. For
example, it added a two-year limitation on applications for reissues to broaden a patent's
claims. The 1870 Act did not contain a time limit on issues, but the courts imposed a flexible
two-year laches period. This is not to say that the Court erred in concluding that these changes
were not material to the question of whether statutory reissue preempts any judicial doctrine of
equivalents. Reissue to broaden a patent's claims was available under the 1870 Act as it is
under the current 1952 Act.
108. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1047 (1997).
109. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
110. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co, 117 S. Ct. at 1047-48.
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claiming, 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6."' The Court disagreed: "Because
§ 112, 6 was enacted as a targeted cure to a specific problem, and
because the reference in that provision to 'equivalents' appears to be
no more than a prophylactic against potential side effects of that cure,
such limited congressional action should not be over-read for nega-
tive implications."" 2
B. Reconciling the Doctrine with the "Definitional and Public
Notice" Functions of Patent Claims Through the Element-
by-Element Approach
Having upheld the doctrine's continuing vitality, the Court noted
that it shared "the concern of the dissenters below that the doctrine of
equivalents, as it has come to be applied since Graver Tank, has
taken on a life of its own that is unbounded by the patent claims."'
There can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when ap-
plied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice func-
tions of the statutory claiming requirement." 14
To respond to these concerns, the Court adopted the suggestion
of the late Judge Helen Nies, who dissented in the Federal Circuit de-
cision below." 5 According to Nies, the Supreme Court's two sepa-
rate lines of precedent, one emphasizing that "it is the claim that de-
fines the invention and gives notice to the public of the limits of the
patent monopoly" and the other recognizing the doctrine of equiva-
111. Id. at 1047.
112. Id. at 1048. The Court said that "under this new provision, an applicant can describe
an element of his invention by the result accomplished or the function served, rather than de-
scribing the item or element to be used (e.g., 'a means of connecting Part A to Part B,' rather
than 'a two-penny nail')." Id. The Court continued by stating:
Congress enacted § 112, 6 in response to Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.
v. Walker, which rejected claims that "do not describe the invention but use
'conveniently functional langua ge at the exact point of novelty,"' 329 U.S. 1, 8
(1946) (citation omitted).... Section 112, 1 6 now expressly allows so-called
"means" claims, with the proviso that application of the broad literal language
of such claims must be limited to only those means that are "equivalent" to the
actual means shown in the patent specification. This is an application of the
doctrine of equivalents in a restrictive role, narrowing the application of broad
literal claim elements. We recognized this type of role for the doctrine of
equivalents in Graver Tank itself .... The added provision, however, is silent on
the doctrine of equivalents as applied where there is no literal infringement.
Id.
113. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. at 1048-49.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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lents, can be reconciled by applying equivalency on an element-by-
element basis. 116
C. Arguments for Restricting the Doctrine
The Court addressed the petitioner's three "alternative argu-
ments in favor of a more restricted doctrine of equivalents than it
feels was applied in this case." 117
1. Prosecution History Estoppel
The first argument concerned prosecution history estoppel. The
fundamental notion of prosecution history (or "file wrapper") estop-
pel is that a patentee who surrendered a broad scope of protection by
claim amendments or other actions during proceedings to obtain the
patent in the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") should not be
able to "recapture" the surrendered subject matter. Estoppel is a
well-recognized limitation on a patentee's ability to assert infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents, but the evolving case law of
the Federal Circuit has created uncertainty as to the circumstances
that can create an estoppel and the scope of an estoppel."'
Petitioner argued for a "rigid" rule that "any surrender of sub-
ject matter during patent prosecution, regardless of the reason for
such surrender, precludes recapturing any part of that subject matter,
even if it is equivalent to the matter expressly claimed."119 Petitioner
also argued that "[a]ny inquiry into the reasons for a surren-
der.., would undermine the public's right to clear notice of the
scope of the patent as embodied in the patent file."'' 20
The Court agreed that "Graver Tank did not dispose of prose-
cution history estoppel as a legal limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents" but rejected the petitioner's position that "the reason for
an amendment during patent prosecution is irrelevant to any subse-
quent estoppel."12' In prior Supreme Court decisions applying prose-
cution history estoppel, the estoppel "was tied to amendments made
to avoid the prior art, or otherwise to address a specific concern -
116. Id. at 1046.
117. Id. at 1049.
118. See discussion infra at Part IV[F][1], Pre-Warner-Jenkinson Federal Circuit Deci-
sions and Part IV[G][1][b], Federal Circuit Decisions.
119. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. at 1049.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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such as obviousness - that arguably would have rendered the
claimed subject matter unpatentable."' 22 The Court noted that the
United States, through its amicus curiae brief, "informs us, that there
are a variety of other reasons why the PTO may request a change in
claim language."' Conceding that "petitioner's rule might provide
a brighter line for determining whether a patentee is estopped under
certain circumstances," this was "not a sufficient reason for adopting
such a rule," "especially... where.., the PTO may have relied
upon a flexible rule of estoppel when deciding whether to ask for a
change in the first place." 124
The case at bar posed a problem, because "the record seems not
to reveal the reason for including the lower pH limit of 6.0."1 2 To
solve the problem, the Court recognized a presumption that amend-
ments were patentability-related, thus placing the burden of showing
otherwise on the patentee. 126
2. Intent to Infringe
The second restriction on the doctrine of equivalents that the
petitioner proposed stemmed from the language in Graver Tank con-
cerning "unscrupulous copyist" and "piracy." Graver Tank's indi-
cation that, given the explicit disclosure of the accused equivalent
element (manganese silicate, the claimed element being magnesium
silicate) in the patent's specification and evidence that "specialists"
in the art understood that the claimed and allegedly equivalent ele-
ments were equivalent and could be substituted, it was proper to
"infer that the accused [product] is the result of imitation rather than
experimentation or invention,"1 27 even "[w]ithout some explanation
or indication that [the accused product] was developed by independ-
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1050. See the discussion of the amicus brief infra Part W[F].
124. Id. at 1050 n.6.
125. Id at 1051. One reason for choosing the numbers 6 and 9 may have been that they
were the only pH limitations for which there existed support in the patent specification. The
"written description" requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 prevents a patent applicant from adding
a limitation to a claim if the limitation is not expressly or inherently described in the specifica-
tion. See Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
As noted supra in Part l[C], the patent described the usual unadjusted pH of the solution
as 9.0 and recommended lowering it to 6 to 8 pH. The specific examples describe pH levels
and adjustments of "6.0 to 8.0," "8.3 to 8.8," "6.5 to 6.7," "9.3 to 9.5," "8.5 to 9.0," "8-
10," "9-11," "6-7."
126. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. at 1051.
127. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
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ent research." ' 128 Petitioner argued that these statements "require ju-
dicial exploration of the equities of a case before allowing application
of the doctrine of equivalents."' 129 The Court disagreed because
[T]he essential predicate of the doctrine of equivalents is the no-
tion of identity between a patented invention and its equivalent,
[thus] there is no basis for treating an infringing equivalent any
differently than a device that infringes the express terms of the
patent. Application of the doctrine of equivalents, therefore, is
akin to determining literal infringement, and neither requires proof
of intent. 130
As to Graver Tank's reference to independent development, the
Court found the Federal Circuit's explanation that "an alleged in-
fringer's behavior, be it copying, designing around a patent, or inde-
pendent experimentation, indirectly reflects the substantiality of the
differences between the patented invention and the accused device or
process"'' to be unsatisfactory. The Court asserted, "At a mini-
mum, one wonders how ever to distinguish between the intentional
copyist making minor changes to lower the risk of legal action, and
the incremental innovator designing around the claims, yet seeking to
capture as much as is permissible of the patented advance."'
32
The Court found that:
[A]nother explanation is available that does not require a diver-
gence from generally objective principles of patent infringement.
In both instances in Graver Tank where we referred to independent
research or experiments, we were discussing the known inter-
changeability between the chemical compound claimed in the pat-
ent and the compound substituted by the alleged infringer. The
need for independent experimentation thus could reflect knowl-
edge - or lack thereof - of interchangeability possessed by one
presumably skilled in the art. The known interchangeability of
substitutes for an element of a patent is one of the express objec-
tive factors noted by Graver Tank as bearing upon whether the ac-
cused device is substantially the same as the patented invention.
Independent experimentation by the alleged infringer would not
always reflect upon the objective question whether a person skilled
128. Id
129. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. at 1052.
130. Id. at 1052.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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in the art would have known of the interchangeability between two
elements, but in many cases it would likely be probative of such
knowledge."'
3. "Time of Infringement" Standard
The third restriction petitioner proposed would limit the doctrine
to those "equivalents that are disclosed within the patent itself."'
134
This proposal may have stemmed from the fact pattern in Graver
Tank, in which the alleged equivalent element was expressly set forth
in the patent's specification. As a "milder version of this argument,"
the petitioner proposed that "the doctrine should be limited to
equivalents that were known at the time the patent was issued, and
should not extend to after-arising equivalents."1 35 The Court rejected
both versions of the proposed restriction.
As we have noted.., with regard to the objective nature of the
doctrine, a skilled practitioner's knowledge of the interchangeabil-
ity between claimed and accused elements is not relevant for its
own sake, but rather for what it tells the fact-finder about the
similarities or differences between those elements. Much as the
perspective of the hypothetical "reasonable person" gives content
to concepts such as "negligent" behavior, the perspective of a
skilled practitioner provides content to, and limits on, the concept
of "equivalence." Insofar as the question under the doctrine of
equivalents is -whether an accused element is equivalent to a
claimed element, the proper time for evaluating equivalency -
and thus knowledge of interchangeability between elements - is
at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued.
And rejecting the milder version of petitioner's argument neces-
sarily rejects the more severe proposition that equivalents must not
only be known, but must also be actually disclosed in the patent in
order for such equivalents to infringe upon the patent. 136
D. Procedural Improvements in Jury Trials
On the issue of the role of juries in determining equivalence, the
Court indicated that it would "decline to take it up... whether, or
how much of, the application of the doctrine of equivalents can be
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1052.
136. Id. at 1052-53.
1998] THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR PATENTS 27
resolved by the court,"' 37 because, although the opinions of the Fed-
eral Circuit judges, the parties, and amici devoted "considerable at-
tention" to the issue, the petitioner made "only passing reference" 118
to the issue in its briefs to the Supreme Court. Petitioner's comments
"go more to the alleged inconsistency between the doctrine of
equivalents and the claiming requirement than to the role of the jury
in applying the doctrine as properly understood."' 139
Nevertheless, the Court noted that there is "ample support" in
its prior cases for the Federal Circuit's holding that "it was for the
jury to decide whether the accused process was equivalent to the
claimed process."' 40 Further, in a footnote, it offered "guidance, not
a specific mandate... [w]ith regard to the concern over unreview-
ability due to black-box jury verdicts:"' 4'
Where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could deter-
mine two elements to be equivalent, district courts are obliged to
grant partial or complete summary judgment. See Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-
323 ... (1986). If there has been a reluctance to do so by some
courts due to unfamiliarity with the subject matter, we are confi-
dent that the Federal Circuit can remedy the problem. Of course,
the various legal limitations on the application of the doctrine of
equivalents are to be determined by the court, either on a pretrial
motion for partial summary judgment or on a motion for judgment
as a matter of law at the close of the evidence and after the jury
verdict. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50. Thus,
under the particular facts of a case, if prosecution history estoppel
would apply or if a theory of equivalence would entirely vitiate a
particular claim element, partial or complete judgment should be
rendered by the court, as there would be no further material issue
for the jury to resolve. Finally, in cases that reach the jury, a spe-
cial verdict and/or interrogatories on each claim element could be
137. Id. at 1053.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1053.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1053 n.8. The Court offered the "guidance" in a footnote, but that the Court
intended the guidance to be taken seriously by the district courts and the Federal Circuit is con-
firmed by the Court's earlier statement in text that "[s]o long as the doctrine of equivalents
does not encroach beyond the limits just described, or beyond related limits to be dis-
cussed... at 1047-1048, 1053 n.8 and 1054-55, we are confident that the doctrine will not
vitiate the central functions of the patent claims themselves." Id. at 1049, Id. at 1871
(emphasis added).
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very useful in facilitating review, uniformity, and possibly post
verdict judgments as a matter of law. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 49;
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50. We leave it to the Federal Circuit how
best to implement procedural improvements to promote certainty,
consistency, and reviewability to this area of the law.142
E. Linguistic Framework of the Doctrine of Equivalents
The final topic addressed by the Court was the debate among the
Federal Circuit judges and between the parties over "the linguistic
framework under which 'equivalence' is determined,"'' 4 in particu-
lar, whether an "insubstantial differences" test is better than a "triple
identity" test. 44 The Court noted weaknesses in each test:
Both the parties and the Federal Circuit spend considerable time
arguing whether the so-called "triple identity" test - focusing on
the function served by a particular claim element, the way that
element serves that function, and the result thus obtained by that
element - is a suitable method for determining equivalence, or
whether an "insubstantial differences approach" is better. There
seems to be substantial agreement that, while the triple identity test
may be suitable for analyzing mechanical devices, it often pro-
vides a poor framework for analyzing other products or processes.
On the other hand, the insubstantial differences test offers little ad-
ditional guidance as to what might render any given difference
"insubstantial." 145
Rather than resolving the debate, the Court emphasized
"limiting principles" and stated its expectation that the Federal Cir-
cuit would formulate and refine the test of equivalence. 46
In our view, the particular linguistic framework used is less im-
portant than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry:
Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or
equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention?
Different linguistic frameworks may be more suitable to different
cases, depending on their particular facts. A focus on individual
elements and a special vigilance against allowing the concept of
equivalence to eliminate completely any such elements should re-
142. Id. at 1053 n.8.
143. Id. at 1054.
144. Id.
145. Id. (emphasis in original).
146. Id.
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duce considerably the imprecision of whatever language is used.
An analysis of the role played by each element in the context of
the specific patent claim will thus inform the inquiry as to whether
a substitute element matches the function, way, and result of the
claimed element, or whether the substitute element plays a role
substantially different from the claimed element. With these lim-
iting principles as a backdrop, we see no purpose in going further
and micro-managing the Federal Circuit's particular word-choice
for analyzing equivalence. We expect that the Federal Circuit will
refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly
course of case-by-case determinations, and we leave such refine-
ment to that court's sound judgment in this area of its special ex-
pertise. 147
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred in the
remand but expressed a concern that the new presumption regarding
prosecution history estoppel "if applied woodenly, might in some in-
stances unfairly discount the expectations of a patentee who had no
notice at the time of patent prosecution that such a presumption
would apply." 4 1
IV. A CRIcAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF WARNER-JENKINSON ON
EQUiVALENCY AND ESTOPPEL LAW
Of great interest is the impact that Warner-Jenkinson will have
on the existing lines of Federal Circuit precedent dealing with issues
that were either not directly or exhaustively addressed by the Su-
preme Court or were explicitly delegated to the Federal Circuit for
"refinement." The following sections critically review some of
those lines of precedent.
A. The Objective Standard for Equivalency
The overall message in Warner-Jenkinson is that a theoretically
imprecise standard of equivalency will not create excessive uncer-
tainty if, in applying the doctrine, the courts are sensitive to the un-
derlying policies and insist that any theory of equivalence put forth
by a patentee not operate to "eliminate completely" the technologi-
cal substance behind a claim element and thereby undermine the
"definitional and notice" functions of claims. Properly and consis-
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1055.
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tently applied, the stricture against "vitiating" a claim element will
be meaningful for its rhetorical force if not for its logic. On the other
hand, there is a risk that the "all elements" approach will be applied
with excessive strictness, causing the result in particular cases to turn
more on formal distinctions than on substance and leading to unfair-
ness to patentees without any significant increase in the level of cer-
tainty concerning patent scope.
1. "Linguistic Framework"
The Federal Circuit Hilton Davis majority adopted
"insubstantial differences" as the "ultimate test," retaining the triple
identity (function-way-result) as a permissible formulation in par-
ticular cases. 49 The Supreme Court suggested that insubstantial dif-
ferences offer "little additional guidance" in determining equiva-
lency and urged the Federal Circuit to formulate further tests "in the
orderly course of case-by-case determinations."' 150 Given that 150
years of judicial experience with the doctrine of equivalents has
failed to evolve an acceptable, precise linguistic framework, one can
be skeptical whether satisfactory general standards or rules exist, and
it may be a waste of intellectual energy to search for and refine an
analytic test of equivalency, just as it has been for the related
"obviousness" standard of patentability.15 '
2. All Elements
The Supreme Court's "all elements" approach to equivalency
was adopted earlier by the 1988 Federal Circuit in the en banc Penn-
walt 52 decision and it was adhered to in subsequent panel deci-
sions.' 53 A significant post-Pennwalt decision, Coming Glass,'14 rec-
ognized that the all elements rule did not require that there be a one-
to-one correspondence between claim limitations and elements in an
149. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521-22 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
150. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1054 (1997).
151. See 2 CiusUM, supra note 3, § 5.04[5].
152. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
153. E.g., Spectra Corp. v. Lutz, 839 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
154. Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir.
1989). The Corning Glass opinion was written by the late Judge Helen Nies, whose analysis
of Supreme Court precedent as requiring an element-by-element approach was later expressly
adopted by the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson.
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accused product or process.15 5 Coming Glass may. have reached a
sensible conclusion on its facts, but its analysis invited subversion of
the all elements rule; creative patentees can be expected to always
postulate some match between claim limitations and single or com-
bined elements in the accused product or process. But, decisions
subsequent to Corning Glass have carefully confined its scope 56 and
have stressed that equivalency "cannot embrace a structure that is
specifically excluded from the scope of the claims."'157
The 1995 en banc Hilton Davis decision did not mention Penn-
walt or the all elements rule; one panel after the Hilton Davis case
showed a lack of enthusiasm for the all elements rule, 58 while others
confirmed the rule's vitality. 59 The sentiments expressed in the latter
decisions gained rhetorical force in view of the Supreme Court's em-
phasis on not vitiating patent claim limitations.
If the all elements rule is applied strictly as an analytic tool
rather than as a general direction, it will not operate as an effective
and fair means for limiting the doctrine of equivalents and increasing
certainty, as the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson assumes. How
the technological substance of a patent claim breaks down into
"elements" or "limitations" is dependent both on what constitutes
an element and the form that a claim drafter uses.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit has offered a
definition of an element of § 112 regarding "means" clauses, or uses
"element" to refer to a "step" for performing a function. In this
sense, the claim at issue in Warner-Jenkinson had only two steps: a
155. Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d at 1259.
156. Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., Inc., 16 F.3d 394 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
157. American Permahedge, Inc. v. Barcana, Inc., 105 F.3d 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Ath-
letic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
158. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857, 861
(Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1240 (1997). In Festo, the district court
properly granted summary judgment of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The
Federal Circuit stated:
Although [the infringer] now argues that there has not been compliance with the
"all elements rule" of Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.... we take
note that.., there need not be one-to-one correspondence between the compo-
nents of an accused device and the claimed invention.
Id. After Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court remanded the Festo case to the Federal Cir-
cuit. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. v. Festo Corp., 117 S. Ct. 1240 (1997).
159. E.g. Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1566-67,
n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (in Hilton Davis, "we did not eliminate the need to prove equivalency on
a limitation-by-limitation basis.... In fact, the majority opinion in Hilton Davis cites Penn-
walt on several occasions as support for the 'insubstantial differences' standard.").
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"subjecting" step and a "recovering" step. But the Supreme Court
implicitly treated the lower end of the pH range as an element, be-
cause the Court remanded for a determination whether that element
had been vitiated by the finding that 5.0 was equivalent to approxi-
mately 6.0 to 9.0 pH.
To illustrate, simplistically, how dependent on formal claim
drafting the all elements rule is, consider a claim to a snuffbox with
six sides. The drafter could claim (1) "a snuffbox comprising a first
side, a second side, a third side, a fourth side, a fifth side, and a sixth
side" or (2) "a six-sided snuffbox." Both claims define exactly the
same literal scope. Does a five-sided snuffbox infringe under the
doctrine of equivalents? The all elements rule, applied woodenly,
would exclude infringement with the first claim because there is a
missing side element. However, there would be equivalency in-
fiingement of the second claim if it were shown that five sides were
substantially the same as six sides.
In the wake of Warner-Jenkinson, this lesson will not be lost for
perceptive patent claim drafters, who will make every effort to re-
duce the number of elements and to group elements together.
3. "Vitiating" a Claim Element
The Federal Circuit's precedents after Pennwalt provide some
guidance on the issue of when a claim element has been "vitiated" or
eliminated.
In Concopco Inc.,'60 a fact pattern not dissimilar to that in War-
ner-Jenkinson, the court held that a district court finding of doctrine
of equivalents infringement was clearly erroneous. 16' The patent
claimed an improved skin care lotion, based on a discovery that a
combination of two ingredients, isoparaffin and DEA-cetyl phos-
phate, unexpectedly increased the lotion's viscosity.162 The claim re-
quired that the ingredients be in a ratio of "from about 40:1 to about
1:1."163 The accused product used a 162.9:1 formulation.'6 4 There
was no prior art precluding an expansion of the claim as the patentee
proposed, but the court held that "[a] conclusion that the 162.9:1
160. Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 32 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1225
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
161. Id. at 1571.
162. Id. at 1559.
163. Id. at 1560.
164. Id. at 1560.
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formulation infringes under the doctrine of equivalents would evis-
cerate the plain meaning of the limitation."1 65
Another example is Wiener, 66 in which the word "column" in a
patent claim to an integrated circuit memory chip with a data matrix
that stores bits of data as columns in a row, the claim providing the
means for extracting data from a row one byte (8-bits) at a time, was
held to be limited to columns located on the chip's data matrix. 167 So
construed, the patent's claims are not infringed, literally or by
equivalents, by a VRAM device in which all the data in a row is ex-
tracted and sent to a register from which the data is then extracted
one byte at a time.1 68
Because the VRAM does not call on columns on the data matrix, it
does not have an element that functions as required by
the... means in the claim. Although the VRAM's data register
may have "columns" similar to the columns claimed in the patent,
the columns in the patent are on the data matrix. The VRAM's
"columns" are not.... This court could not extend protection to
the VRAM without ignoring the meanings and limitations of the
language of claim 9. See Dolly... ("The doctrine of equivalents
is not a license to ignore claim limitations."). 169
On the other hand, an example of a case in which a claim was
found to be infringed under the doctrine of equivalents is Zygo Corp.
v. Wyko Corp.70 The patent claimed an interferometer that operated
in both alignment and viewing modes. 171 It required that a monitor
screen have a visible "cross-hair" reticle to be used for alignment. 72
The accused device had no physical reticle, but generated an align-
ment marking with software. 73 The court had "no difficulty agree-
ing that the image of the reticle generated on the monitor is the
equivalent of the physical reticle."174
B. Time of Infringement Approach and Impact of Patentability
165. Id. at 1562.
166. Wiener v. NEC Elecs., Inc., 102 F.3d 534 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
167. Id. at 540.
168. Id. at 540-41.
169. Id. at 541.
170. 79 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
171. Id. at 1565.
172. Id. at 1566.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1569.
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ofAccused Product or Process
The Supreme Court's "time of infringement" approach to de-
termining equivalency affirms the approach taken by the Federal
Circuit majority in Hilton Davis 75 The approach flows logically
from the Court's equation of infringement by equivalents with
"literal infringement": the infringement inquiry is an objective
one - does the accused product or process conform to the language
of the claim, literally or in substance? Other subjective or time-
variable issues, such as when or how the accused infringer developed
the accused product or process, are not determinative.
Potentially, questions could be asked as to what is meant by the
"time of infringement," especially when the infringement occurs
over a lengthy period of time during which the state of the art
evolves. Is it the date when the accused product or process was de-
signed? When the first infringing act occurred? Can the same prod-
uct or process infringe at one point in time but not at another because
of changing knowledge in the art as to how. an alleged equivalent
element functions and hence whether it is equivalent? Careful analy-
sis of the Warner-Jenkinson opinion suggests that these issues are es-
sentially irrelevant. Equivalency, for purposes of the doctrine of
,equivalents, is treated as an objective fact, provable at trial, just as
identity is evaluated for purposes of literal infringement. The issue is
175. The Court cited a portion of the United States amicus brief in its discussion of prose-
cution history estoppel. In the cited portion of the amicus brief, a footnote contains an argu-
ment and an example concerning later-developed equivalents:
Of course, when an accused equivalent (meeting the objective standard of in-
substantiality) could not have been known because it was developed or discov-
ered only after the patent issued, the case for application of the doctrine of
equivalents becomes especially clear. For example, a claim to a chemical com-
position might include an inactive filler as a minor, unimportant ingredient.
After the patent issues, a competitor of the patentee might manufacture a com-
position exactly as claimed but use a different, inactive filler, unknown in the
art at the time the patent application was filed, that performs exactly as those lit-
erally covered by the claim. Such a substitution, once it became available,
might be known to persons of skill in the relevant art to be interchangeable with
the claimed filler, and yet it would not have been possible to include the ac-
cused element in the patent because it did not exist at the time of issue. See
Martin Adelman & Gary Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law:
Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673, 707-708,
712-715 (1989) (endorsing legitimacy of doctrine of equivalents to capture
equivalents generated by new technology).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) (No. 95-728), available in 1996 WL 172221, *23 n.7.
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not whether the equivalency of a substituted element was known in or
obvious from the art at any point in time. The Court noted that the
"known interchangeability of substitutes for an element of a patent is
one of the express objective factors noted by Graver Tank as bearing
upon whether the accused device is substantially the same as the pat-
ented invention."1 76 This indicates that the knowledge and the state
of the art is a "factor" that "bears upon" substantial similarity but is
not the ultimate test of substantial similarity or equivalency. Later,
the Court again stressed that "a skilled practitioner's knowledge of
the interchangeability between claimed and accused elements is not
relevant for its own sake, but rather for what it tells the fact-finder
about the similarities or differences between those elements."177
The Court did not directly address the related, difficult issue of
whether the patentability of a later-developed accused device or
method is relevant to equivalency. However, it is well-settled that a
patent on an accused product or process does not give the owner of
the patent a right to exploit the product or process by using without
authority an earlier patentee's technology. 178 The existence of a pat-
ent does not provide a defense to literal infringement of a claim. For
example, in Bio-Technology General Corp.,17 9 Genentech's patent
claiming a recombinant process for producing a hormone read liter-
ally on the accused infringer's process. The accused infringer argued
that its process involved a unique, patented purification method. The
court dismissed the argument:
That [the accused infringer] patented its unique purification
method is irrelevant: "[T]he existence of one's own patent does
not constitute a defense to infringement of someone else's patent.
It is elementary that a patent grants only the right to exclude others
and confers no right on its holder to make, use, or sell."SO
Some Federal Circuit decisions suggest that a patent granted by
the PTO on the accused device may be relevant to the substantiality
of the difference between the patent claim and the accused device, at
least when the patent in suit was cited and considered by the PTO
176. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1052 (1997).
177. Id. at 1053 (emphasis added).
178. See 5 CHIsUM, supra note 3, § 16.02[l][a].
179. Bio-Technology Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
180. Id. at 1559.
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when issuing the subsequent patent.181 Other decisions limit the sig-
nificance of the subsequent patenting.8 2
The Supreme Court's adoption in Warner-Jenkinson of an ob-
jective test of substantial equivalency at the time of infringement
strongly suggests that patentability, which turns on the state of the art
prior to an invention, may be of only limited relevance.
The patentability of an accused product or process often stems
from what may be characterized as an additive or selective improve-
ment, adding elements, features, or functions to the earlier patented
invention or discovering preferred species for generic elements in the
earlier invention, rather than from a mere substitution of one element
for another.' In such cases, Federal Circuit decisions recognize that
an accused product or process does not avoid infringement by adding
functions or features if it contains literally or by equivalents all the
elements of patent claim in question. 1
181. Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Hoganas AB v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
182. Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chem. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Nat'l
Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
183. Cf. ,Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Nies, J.,
additional views):
It is a truism that the fact that an accused device is itself patented does not pre-
clude a finding that such device infringes an earlier patent of another. However,
the fact of a second patent, depending on its subject matter, may be relevant to
the issue of whether the changes are substantial.
If the second patent requires practice of the first, i.e., the second merely adds
an element "D" to a patented combination A+B+C, the combination A+B+C+D
clearly infringes. Conversely, if the second patent is granted for A+B+D over
one claiming A+B+C, the change from C to D must not have been obvious to be
validly patented. Evidence of a patent covering the change, in my view, is
clearly relevant unless the patent is invalid ... A substitution in a patented in-
vention cannot be both nonobvious and insubstantial. I would apply nonobvi-
ousness as the test for the "insubstantial change" requirement of Hilton Davis.
184. Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Infringement un-
der the doctrine of equivalents does not vanish merely because the accused device performs
functions in addition to those performed by the claimed device."); Insta-Foan Products, Inc. v.
Universal Foam Systems, Inc., 906 F.2d 698, 702 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("It is the limitations and
functions of the invention described in the claim, not the elements or functions of the accused
device, which establish the reference point for the doctrine of equivalents analysis.").
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C. Equivalency of Disclosed But Unclaimed Alternative
Embodiments
Recent Federal Circuit decisions,18 following an 1881 Supreme
Court decision, 186 apply a theory of "dedication by unclaimed disclo-
sure" to bar a finding of equivalency when the alleged equivalent is
expressly disclosed but not literally claimed in the patent itself. For
example, in Maxwell,8 7 the patent concerned a system for attaching
mated pairs of shoes. The patent's claims.required an "extended
separate tab" arrangement. An accused product used an "under the
sock lining" arrangement. The patent disclosed an "under the sock
lining" arrangement as an alternative embodiment. The Federal Cir-
cuit, in an opinion by Judge Lourie, reversed a judgment of infringe-
ment based on a jury verdict.' It reasoned that to allow an equiva-
lency finding in such a case would permit patentees to file broad
disclosures and then escape PTO examination by presenting only nar-
row claims. 89 It noted that a patentee who claims too narrowly can
seek reissue within two years of the patent's issuance. 90
In Maxwell, Judge Lourie carefully distinguished the Supreme
Court's Graver Tank decision, in which the alleged equivalent ele-
ment (manganese silicate) was disclosed in the specification.' 91 In
Graver Tank, the patent contained both a broad claim that included
manganese silicates and a narrower claim that was limited to alkaline
earth silicates and excluded manganese silicates. The Supreme Court
held that the broader claim was invalid but that the narrower claim
was valid and infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 92 Thus, as
Judge Lourie noted, the disclosed equivalent was not in fact
"unclaimed" and could not be said to have been dedicated by the
patentee. 93
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court did not directly ad-
185. Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Unique Concepts, Inc. v.
Brown, 939 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1881).
186. Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 (1981) ("the claim of a specific device or
combination, an omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on the face of the
patent are, in law, a dedication to the public of that which is not claimed").
187. Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
188. R at 1112.
189. Ikdat 1107.
190. Id. at 1107 n.2.
191. Id at 1107.
192. Id at 1107.
193. Id.
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dress the issue of dedication by unclaimed disclosure. It did reject
the opposite argument - that equivalents should be limited to
equivalents disclosed in the patent. 94 The rejected argument as-
sumed that unclaimed disclosed alternative embodiments might be
equivalent, but it does not follow that the Court accepted the as-
sumption behind the rejected argument. The dedication theory relies
in part on the view that equivalency subverts the claiming, examina-
tion, and reissue provisions of the patent. Warner-Jenkinson rejects
the argument that those provisions completely abolished the doctrine
of equivalents, but, again, it does not follow that those provisions
should not be looked to as a reason for imposing a more specific,
policy-based limitation on the doctrine.
D. Effect of Prior Art on the Analysis of Equivalency and the
Special Case of Pioneer Inventions
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court did not address the
limiting effect of prior art on the doctrine of equivalents because a
question concerning that effect was not presented.
Nothing in the Court's analysis of equivalents undermines the
settled rule, recognized in Federal Circuit decisions, that the doctrine
of equivalents cannot encompass a product or process that is identical
to or an obvious variation of the prior art.195 On the other hand, as a
Federal Circuit panel stressed in Conroy, 96 the standard of compari-
son is the accused device as a whole to the prior art; "the mere exis-
tence of an element in the prior art" does not "automatically pre-
clude a patentee from asserting a scope of equivalency sufficient to
encompass the corresponding element in the accused device."1 97
The Supreme Court did mention in a footnote the special status
of "pioneer" inventions under the doctrine of equivalents in the
course of rejecting an argument that "the evolution in patent practice
from 'central' claiming (describing the core principles of the inven-
tion) to 'peripheral' claiming (describing the outer boundaries of the
invention)" required treating Graver Tank and the doctrine of
194. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1040 (1997).
195. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d (Fed. Cir. 1990).
See also Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1992); We Care, Inc. v.
Ultra Mark Int'l Corp., 930 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
196. Conroy v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
197. Id. at 1048 n.4.
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equivalents as an "aberration." 19 8
[J]udicial recognition of so-called "pioneer" patents suggests that
the abandonment of "central" claiming may be overstated. [The
possibility of judicial recognition that] a claim describing a limited
improvement in a crowded field will have a limited range of per-
missible equivalents does not negate the availability of the doctrine
vel non. 199
E. "Procedural Improvements"
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court clearly empathized
with the concerns expressed by the dissenting Federal Circuit judges
about abuses in assertions of equivalency, especially "the concern
over unreviewability due to black-box jury verdicts. ' 200 In addition
to requiring a more strict substantive equivalency standard that pre-
cludes vitiation of claim limitations, the Court discussed "procedural
improvements" in footnote 8 of the case.201
1. Summary Judgment
Footnote 8 directs the district courts to entertain favorable
motions for summary judgment to dismiss equivalency claims when
(1) "no reasonable jury could determine two elements to be equiva-
lent" or (2) a "legal limitation" 202 on equivalency applies, including
(a) prosecution history estoppel, or (b) "a theory of equivalence
would entirely vitiate a particular claim element [such that] partial or
complete judgment should be rendered by the court, as there would
be no further material issue for the jury to resolve. ' 203
If a district court declines to grant summary judgment, the deci-
sion is normally not appealable. But the Supreme Court in Warner-
Jenkinson suggested "[i]f there has been a reluctance to [grant sum-
mary judgment] by some courts due to unfamiliarity with the subject
matter, we are confident that the Federal Circuit can remedy the
problem. ' ' 2°4 One expects the Federal Circuit, in response to the Su-
preme Court's urging, to find means to encourage district courts to
198. Varner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem., 117 S. Ct. at 1040.
199. Id.
200. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem., 117 S. Ct. at 1053 n.8.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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grant proper motions.2 05
A line of Federal Circuit decisions approving summary judg-
ment against groundless equivalency claims predates Warner-
Jenkinson.2 6 Indeed, the granting of summary judgment against
equivalency has become a regular occurrence. 207
Since the Markman decisions, 20 which held that construction of
a patent claim is a question of law, a practice of holding "Markman
hearings" started in the district courts. 209 In the course of ruling on
claim construction, the court must necessarily become familiar with
the patent and the technology. It would be a logical and practical
extension of "Markman hearings" to include the threshold legal is-
sues concerning assertion of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.
2. Verdict Forms, and Linking Evidence and Argument in
Jury Presentations
In footnote 8, the Supreme Court also suggested that district
courts in jury trials on equivalency use "a special verdict and/or in-
terrogatories on each claim element," which "could be very useful in
facilitating review, uniformity, and possibly post-verdict judgments
205. Id.
206. Gentex Corp. v. Donnelly Corp., 69 F.3d 527, 530 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Wolverine
World Wide, Inc. v. Nike Inc., 38 F.3d 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 954 (Fed. Cir. 1993); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
207. The following are some district court decisions granting summary judgment against
equivalency assertions reported in the past three years: Monroe Eng'g Products, Inc. v. J.W.
Winco, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 901 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Soil Solutions Inc. v. Spraying Devices Inc.,
40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1321 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Chalais v. Milton Bradley Co., 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d
(BNA) 1197 (S.D. N.Y. 1996); GTY Indus. v. Genlyte Group Inc., 38 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA)
1801, 1805 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Chim-Cap Corp. v. American Chimney Supplies Inc., 38
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1798 (E.D. N.Y. 1996); Rolite, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Teehs., Inc., 903 F.
Supp. 870 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Ferag AG v. Grapha-Holding AG, 905 F. Supp. 1, (D. D.C. 1995);
Atlantia Corp. v. Sea Eng'g Associates Inc., 36 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1283 (S.D. Tex. 1995);
Development Ctr. Hansen- Hundebol A/S v. QW Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1722 (N.D. Ga.
1995); L.A. Gear Inc. v. E.S. Originals Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1497 (C.D. Cal. 1995);
Laminating Co. of Am. v. Tri-Star Laminates Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1149 (C.D. Cal.
1995); Hoppe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 878 F. Supp. 303, 310 (D. Mass. 1995).
208. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, aff'g, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en bane).
209. See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572,
1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (trial judge held a five day pre-trial "Markman hearing... to determine
the scope of the claims at issue").
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as a matter of law. ' 210 In the past, Federal Circuit decisions did not
mandate the use of special verdicts or interrogatories.211 To obtain
greater predictability, especially when infringement is tried before a
jury, the Lear Siegler and Malta decisions imposed a special proof
standard, requiring a patentee to provide evidence and "linking" ar-
gument on all three FWR (triple identity) prongs (function, way, re-
sult).212 Recent Federal Circuit panel decisions expressed opposing
views on whether the Lear-Siegler-Malta requirement survived the
en bane Hilton Davis decision.213 The Supreme Court's encourage-
ment of procedural improvements to assure reviewability of jury ver-
dicts supports the reasoning underlying the Lear-Siegler-Malta re-
210. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem., 117 S. Ct. at 1053 n.8.
211. Compare Weiner v. Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797 (1984) (refusing to consider special
verdicts and interrogatories because they are not mandatory) with Structural Rubber Products
Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707 (1984) (suggesting the use of special verdicts and inter-
rogatories).
212. Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (the district
court correctly granted a noninfringement judgment notwithstanding a contrary jury verdict;
the patentee's testimony failed to provide "a sufficient explanation of both why the overall
function, way, and result of the accused device are substantially the same as those of the
claimed device and why the [accused devices' element that did not literally conform to a spe-
cific claim limitation] is the equivalent of [that limitation]." (emphasis in original)); Lear
Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co. of Mich., Inc., 873 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989). See also
Genentech, Inc. v. The Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
213. Compare Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558,
1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (in Hilton Davis):
[V]e did not eliminate the need to prove equivalency on a limitation-by-
limitation basis .... Nor did we overrule precedent requiring equivalency to be
proven with "particularized testimony and linking argument." See Lear Siegler,
Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co.,... Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc ..... a pat-
entee must still provide particularized testimony and linking argument as to the
"insubstantiality of the differences" between the claimed invention and the ac-
cused device or process, or with respect to the function, way, result test when
such evidence is presented to support a finding of infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents. Such evidence must be presented on a limitation-by-
limitation basis.
Ma with National Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1996) which
held that the infringer's argument that the patentee:
[D]id not provide sufficiently explicit witness testimony and "linking attorney
argument" on each of four factual questions of function, way, result, and
"why," citing Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co... and the concurring
opinion in Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc.... as requiring this formulaic
exposition by witnesses and lawyers.. .lacks merit.
Id. at 1191. "The court's en banc decision in Hilton Davis made clear that no
specific formulation of evidence and argument is required. Thus this argument
is without substance, and indeed neither Lear-Siegler nor Malta requires any
particular formulation." Id.
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quirement.
F. Amendments Driven by "Non-Prior Art" Reasons Such as
Lack of Enablement
Whether and when an estoppel should apply to claim elements
added for reasons not related to the prior art is a critical issue which
the Supreme Court failed to resolve clearly in Warner-Jenkinson.
The Court rejected a rigid rule, proposed by the petitioner, that
would have barred recapturing "any surrender of subject matter dur-
ing patent prosecution, regardless of the reason for such surren-
der.' ' 214 In contrast, the Court recognized a presumption that "the
PTO had a substantial reason related to patentability for including the
limiting element added by amendment" and that estoppel "would bar
the application of the doctrine [of] equivalents as to that element. ' 215
The patentee can rebut the presumption by showing that the amend-
ment was for a reason not related to patentability. 26 This presump-
tion helps preserve "the primacy of the PTO in ensuring that the
claims allowed cover only subject matter that is properly patentable
in a proffered patent applications. '21 7
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court noted that in prior Supreme
Court cases finding an estoppel, the estoppel was tied to
"amendments made to avoid the prior art, or otherwise to address a
specific concern - such as obviousness - that arguably would have
rendered the claimed subject matter unpatentable. ' 218 The Court also
noted that the United States amicus curiae, for which counsel for the
PTO appeared, indicated that "there are a variety of other reasons
why the PTO may request a change in claim language." 219 The Su-
preme Court did not specifically cite such reasons, and its opinion
oscillates between referring to changes to avoid "the prior art" and,
more broadly, to reasons relating to "patentability," the latter poten-
tially including non-prior art grounds for rejecting claims and re-
quiring amendments. Thus, Warner-Jenkinson does not unequivo-
cally resolve the issue whether non-prior art grounds that do concern
patentability can create an estoppel.
214. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem., 117 S. Ct. at 1049.
215. Id. at 1051.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1049.
219. Id. at 1050.
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The United States amicus brief, in the portion cited by the Su-
preme Court in Warner-Jenkinson, refers to two non-art grounds: in-
definiteness, which court decisions have long treated as not creating
an estoppel, 220 and non-enablement, about which the decisions are
less clear.22' The brief cites and then discusses the Federal Circuit's
1995 decision in Pall Corp.,'2 in which a Federal Circuit panel found
no estoppel even though the applicant had voluntarily narrowed the
scope of his claims because his experiments showed that the inven-
tion was not operable to the full extent of the original claims and had
represented to the PTO examiner that the claims were "rather nar-
row."'' The amicus brief also states that "[t]he purpose of the en-
ablement requirement is not to limit the scope of the patent right, but
to ensure that the invention has been fully disclosed. ' 224 This state-
ment is inconsistent with the many decisions indicating that the scope
of enablement must be commensurate with the scope of a claim and
the decisions rejecting or invalidating applicant (or patentee) claims
because of undue breadthm5
1. Pre-Warner-Jenkinson Federal Circuit Decisions
Federal Circuit decisions before Warner-denkinson did not
strictly confine estoppel to amendments based on the prior art. For
example, in Texas Instruments (1993), 221 a Federal Circuit panel
found an estoppel when the inventors asserted during prosecution that
their invention, which concerned semiconductor device plastic en-
capsulation, was limited to an "opposite-side" gating arrangement
because "same-side" gating would not work. The court noted:
220. See, e.g., Bishman Mfg. Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 380 F.2d 336, 340 (7th Cir.
1967).
221. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Corp. v. Paragon Gear Works, Inc., 355 F.2d 400 (Ist Cir.
1965).
222. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, 66 F3d 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied 117 S.
Ct. 1243 (1997).
223. Id. at 1219.
224. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) (No. 95-728), available in 1996 WL 172221, *23.
225. E.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm.
Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
The idea that a patent claim is invalid if its scope exceeds what the patent specification
disclosure justifies dates back to O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 61 (1853), which up-
held Samuel Morse's claims to the telegraph but invalidated a claim in the patent to any means
for electronically telecommunicating.
226. Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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As a general proposition, prosecution history estoppel is based
upon a showing that an applicant amended a claim to avoid a cited
prior art reference.... Amendment of a claim in light of a prior art
reference, however, is not the sine qua non to establish prosecution
history estoppel. Unmistakable assertions made by the applicant to
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in support of patentability,
whether or not required to secure allowance of the claim, also may
operate to preclude the patentee from asserting equivalency be-
tween a limitation of the claim and a substituted structure or proc-
ess step.... Application of this test requires, in each case, exami-
nation of the prosecution history taken as a whole....
Having represented that same-side gating does not work, and hav-
ing distinguished cited prior art as not teaching the functional op-
posite-side gated process, [the patentee] cannot foreclose reliance
upon its unambiguous surrender of subject matter.... Such fore-
closure is impermissible because "other players in the marketplace
are entitled to rely on the record made in the Patent office in de-
termining the meaning and scope of the patent." 227
2. The Federal Circuit's Remand Order
Warner-Jenkinson does not speak clearly enough with regard to
estoppel to resolve the evident tension between Federal Circuit deci-
sions such as Pall and Texas Instruments. The Supreme Court's re-
mand to the Federal Circuit gave the court, sitting en bane, an op-
portunity to develop criteria, perhaps after asking for additional
briefing, for what estoppel effect, if any, should be given to amend-
ments not driven by prior art objections. Unfortunately, the Federal
Circuit abdicated, at least temporarily, the general responsibility im-
posed on it by the Supreme Court to develop clarifying standards on
patent claim scope.
The Federal Circuit remanded the case:
[T]o the district court to conduct an inquiry to ascertain whether
Hilton Davis can rebut the presumption by showing the reason for
the amendment of the claim to place a lower pH limit of approxi-
mately 6.0 on the ultrafiltration process and whether that reason is
sufficient to overcome the estoppel bar to the application of the
doctrine of equivalents.228
227. Id. at 1174-75.
228. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
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In the Remand Order, the Federal Circuit did not discuss in de-
tail what reasons are "sufficient." The Federal Circuit noted only
that (1) "what reason is sufficient depends on the particular facts of
the case," 29 citing the Pall case and (2) "in conducting the inquiry,
the Supreme Court has cautioned the courts to consider carefully the
importance of public notice and reliance on the prosecution history,
as well as the need for fairness to the patentee." 0
The Remand Order stated "[I]f the district court determines that
a reason not related to patentability prompted an amendment, the
court must then decide if that reason is sufficient to overcome estop-
pel."2'3 This statement suggests that some amendments for reasons
unrelated to "patentability" will nevertheless create estoppels. This
is consistent with Pall, which the Remand Order cites, and the other
pre-Warner-Jenkinson decisions discussed above, which indicate that
amendments driven by disclosure sufficiency and other non-prior art
reasons may or may not create an estoppel, depending on the circum-
stances.
The view that some amendments driven by a reason or purpose
not related to patentability will create estoppels represents a correct
interpretation of the Supreme Court's Warner-Jenkinson decision is
problematic. One can read the Warner-Jenkinson opinion as indi-
cating that a showing by a patentee that a claim amendment was for a
reason not "related to patentability" fully rebuts the presumption and
eliminates any estoppel. Consider the following passage:
Mindful that claims do indeed serve both a definitional and a no-
tice function, we think [A] the better rule is to place the burden on
the patent-holder to establish the reason for an amendment re-
quired during patent prosecution. [B] The court then would decide
whether that reason is sufficient to overcome prosecution history
estoppel as a bar to application of the doctrine of equivalents to the
element added by that amendment. [C] Where no explanation is
established, however, the court should presume that the PTO had a
substantial reason related to patentability for including the limit-
ing element added by amendment? 2
First, [A] indicates that the initial determination is simply what
229. Id. at 1163.
230. Id.
231. Id
232. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1051 (1997)
(brackets inserted, emphasis added).
46 COMPUTER & IGHTECINOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 14
was the reason for the amendment. Then, [B] indicates that second
determination is "whether the reason is sufficient." Finally, [C] is
confusing and arguably illogical, because it reintroduces a presump-
tion after a presumption is not rebutted. However, taken in context, it
could mean simply that a "sufficient" "reason" or "explanation" is
the opposite of "a substantial reason related to patentability," that is,
a reason not related to patentability.
Other portions of the Warner-Jenkinson opinion could support a
"depending on the circumstances" approach to amendments "not
related to patentability." At the end of the opinion, the Supreme
Court restates its holding:
[I]f the patent-holder demonstrates that an amendment required
during prosecution had a purpose unrelated to patentability, a court
must consider that purpose in order to decide whether an estoppel
is precluded. Where the patent holder is unable to establish such a
purpose, a court should presume that the purpose behind the re-
quired amendment is such that prosecution history estoppel would
apply.233
This statement is as confusing as the earlier discussion in sug-
gesting that failure to establish a fact leads to a presumption, but it
suggests that a court still has a determination to make even after it
has concluded that an amendment was for a purpose unrelated to pat-
entability. The Court's restatement can be read another way; in refer-
ring to "must consider," the Court may have meant that an amend-
ment's "purpose" (i.e. related to patentability or unrelated to
patentability) must be considered and will be preclusive of an estop-
pel when the purpose is "unrelated to patentability."
3. Undue Breadth Nonenablement Rejections -
Distinguishing Nonenablement and Lack of Written
Description: A Hypothetical Example
Some may argue that it is fundamentally unfair that a patentee
should be able to show infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents by accused products or processes that could not have been liter-
ally claimed because the patent specification failed to provide an
enabling disclosure. Others may respond that these concerns do not
take sufficient account of (1) the interplay between the distinct dis-
closure requirements of an enabling disclosure and a written descrip-
233. Id. at 1054.
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tion of the invention and (2) the different time frameworks for deter-
mining enablement (filing date) and equivalency (time of infringe-
ment).
A hypothetical example may illustrate this debate and the inter-
play between equivalents, enablement and the written description re-
quirement. Assume that an inventor files an application concerning a
new integrated micro-video semiconductor chip. The applicant's
specification discloses as the single working example or embodiment
a chip that includes, inter alia, a connector made of the precious
metal platinum. The applicant claims "an integrated micro-video
semiconductor chip comprising.., precious metal connector
means." The examiner rejects the claim as not enabled for all pre-
cious metals, because such metals have varying electrical qualities
and applicant failed to show that one of skill in the art could make an
operable chip using all precious metals, such as silver, which have
electrical qualities differing significantly from platinum. The appli-
cant then amends the original claim as follows: "an integrated micro-
video semiconductor chip comprising... [precious metal] platinum
connector means." The applicant also adds a second claim to a video
chip comprising "connector means of a metal selected from the
group consisting of platinum, palladium, and gold." The examiner
allows the first claim but rejects the second for lack of written de-
scription, because the specification contains no support for the plati-
num-palladium-gold group limitation. The applicant cancels the sec-
ond claim and obtains the patent. Later, the applicant asserts the
platinum claim against video chips that use a palladium chip, offering
evidence that, in the context of this video chip, palladium is the sub-
stantial equivalent to platinum.
Those urging an estoppel would contend, with some plausibility,
that it would be ironic to find that a palladium chip infringes through
equivalence when the PTO rejected claims that would have literally
covered that chip. Those opposing an estoppel would respond that a
PTO determination that an inventor-applicant is not entitled to claims
to a specific subset of potential embodiments is not a determination
that those embodiments do not fall within the applicant's invention
claimed in different or broader terms, either a generic claim or a
more specific claim, which includes a range of objective equiva-
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lents.214 Rejection of the original claim (all precious metals) did not
necessarily mean that a functional equivalent (palladium) of the dis-
closed embodiment (platinum) was not enabled even at the time the
application was filed, much less at the time of infringement.235 One
skilled in the art may have known that palladium was interchangeable
with platinum in its microelectronic properties and that both were
distinctly different from other precious metals such as silver.
4. A Step Back: What Is the Basis for Prosecution History
Estoppel?
Many of the ambiguities concerning file wrapper estoppel can
be traced to the lack of clarity regarding the doctrine's nature and
purpose. The doctrine's label - "estoppel" - and case law suggest
three distinct possible rationales for prosecution history estoppel: (1)
a true estoppel (i.e. preclusion through representation and reliance),
which would make the estoppel an affmnative defense rather than a
tool of claim interpretation and application, (2) an abandonment or a
disclaimer, and (3) exhaustion of administrative remedies23 6
A satisfactory rationale for prosecution history estoppel, con-
sistently used, could not only provide guidance in applying the doc-
trine but also provide a satisfactory explanation for what appears, at
first blush, to be an illogical result: two potential claims, one issuing
as originally-filed, the other issuing after broader claims are canceled
or amended, will have different effective scopes even though the two
are (1) identically-worded, (2) based on identical specifications, and
(3) issued on the basis of the same state of the prior art.
True, estoppel is not as satisfactory a rationale as it may first
appear. For one thing, actual reliance by an accused infringer has
never been required. Federal Circuit decisions have postulated that
the reliance is constructive, or in other words, fictitious: "The legal
standard for determining what subject matter was relinquished is an
234. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1582 n.7,
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
235. Cf. Coulter Elecs., Inc. v. J. T. Baker Chem. Co., 487 F.Supp. 1172 (N.D. IlI. 1980)
(examiner rejected original claim for lack of enablement since element "metallic phosphates"
included over 70 specific compounds; applicant substituted two specific metallic phosphates:
sodium di-hydrogen phosphate and di-sodium phosphate. After issuance, patentee is not es-
topped from extending claim by doctrine or equivalents to cover defendant's compound con-
taining potassium di-hydrogen phosphate, a well-known equivalent to sodium di-hydrogen
phosphate).
236. See 5 CHisUM, supra note 3, § 18.05[l].
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objective one, measured from the vantage point of what a competitor
was reasonably entitled to conclude, from the prosecution history,
that the applicant gave up to procure issuance of the patent."' 2 7 This
standard suffers from a logical flaw of circularity: in defining estop-
pel, the courts cannot expect to find objective factual support in the
views of reasonable competitors, because a well-advised competitor
would base an assessment of what has been surrendered on a predic-
tion of what the courts will hold if presented with the issue in an in-
fringement suit.
Abandonment or disclaimer is also not fully satisfactory as a ra-
tionale for prosecution history estoppel. Generally, the courts are
reluctant to find an abandonment or forfeiture of legal rights. Thus,
they require a showing of intent to abandon. Yet it is clear that file
wrapper estoppel applies regardless of the patentee's subjective intent
when the patentee amends claims or makes arguments about patent-
ability.
Perhaps the most satisfactory rationale for file wrapper estoppel
is the exhaustion of administrative remedies. If an inventor adopts a
narrow definition in the Patent and Trademark Office in order to ob-
tain a patent and then relies upon a broader definition in an infringe-
ment suit, they pro tanto circumvent the administrative procedures
and expertise of the PTO.
The exhaustion of remedies rationale does not provide an imme-
diately obvious reason for excluding amendments made in response
to insufficient disclosure rejections. The answer may lie in the dif-
fering time frameworks for determining enablement and equivalence.
The former is clearly assessed at the filing date of the inventor's pat-
ent application. In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court held that
equivalency was assessed at the time of the alleged infringement.
This necessarily means that an inventor may obtain coverage through
equivalency over some subject matter that could not have been liter-
ally claimed due to enablement constraints. On the other hand, an
inventor may never establish equivalency infringement by subject
matter that could not be literally claimed because of prior art con-
straints.
Scholars have addressed these difficult issues concerning estop-
237. Haynes Int'l, Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993), reh'g, 15 F.3d
1076 (Fed. Cir. 1994). See also Mark I. Mktg. Corp. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 66 F.3d
285 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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pel and equivalency with regard to enablement in terms of policy and
economic analysis.138 Unfortunately, to date, the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit have attempted to resolve the issues without ex-
plicit reference to policy analysis, relying instead primarily on case
precedent and judicial doctrine.
G. Scope of Estoppel Created by Prior-Art Driven Amendments
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court did not explicitly address the
scope of an estoppel that arises in the situation when an amendment
was made clearly for the purpose of distinguishing prior art, but the
prior art distinguished by the amendment is actually distant from the
claim element and its alleged equivalent.
1. Pre-Warner-Jenkinson Lower Court Decisions: Rigid
and Flexible Approaches
Lower court decisions before Warner-Jenkinson showed varying
attitudes toward the scope of the estoppel and the extent to which the
court can evaluate the prior art.
a. Pre-1983 Decisions
An instructive pre-1982 decision was a handed down by the
Fifth Circuit in Nationwide,219 which, like Warner-Jenkinson, in-
volved a numeric limitation added in order to distinguish prior art
cited by the Patent Office. The patent at issue in the case involved a
method that controlled mites on citrus groves and comprised of ap-
plying a composition with an active ingredient "'at an effective dos-
age of less than 4 ounces per acre."' 240 The accused products "called
for use in amounts greater than 4 ounces per acre."241 The patentee
argued that the 4 ounce limitation was inserted "only to point out the
difference from the high dosage, 48 ounces per acre of the prior art"
and, therefore, the claim covers "all 'low dosages"' of the active in-
gredient for estoppel purposes 242 It cited prior decisions, Hunt2 43 and
238. E.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839 (1990). See also Mark A. Lemley, "The Economics of Im-
provement in Intellectual Property Law," 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997).
239. Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 584 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1978).
240. Id. at 716, quoting U.S. Patent 3,420,935.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 718.
243. Hunt Tool Co. v. Lawrence, 242 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.).
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Ziegler,24 for the proposition that "an applicant should not be pre-
sumed to have made a disclaimer broader than necessary to yield to
the actual challenge to his claim." 245 The court disagreed. First, it
was mere speculation whether a more restricted limitation, such as
"low dosage," would have been accepted by the examiner.
If the [sic] Nationwide had amended its claim to say that it claimed
the use of hexachlorophene in "low dosages," perhaps its claim
would have been allowed by the Examiner; but by the same token,
perhaps it would not have been allowed. If that was not allowed,
perhaps the Examiner would have allowed a limit of less than 8
ounces per acre, or perhaps less than 5 ounces per acre. We do not
know. That is the problem with Nationwide's argument. It has a
certain surface appeal, because of the large gap between the prior
art reference of 48 ounces per acre and Nationwide's limitation of
4 ounces per acre, and the closeness of Wright's dosages to Na-
tionwide's. The difficulty, however, is that it would cause us to
place ourselves in the Examiner's place, and either guess what he
would have allowed if faced with the question, or substitute our
judgment for that of the Examiner, who is the expert in this field.
The simpler solution is to look at the question of whether the pat-
entee had to insert a limitation in the broader sense. It is clear be-
yond dispute that Nationwide had to put some limit on its dosages
of hexachlorophene. In that sense, its amendment was required by
the Examiner's rejection of Nationwide's earlier claims based on
the prior art. Since some dosage limitation was required, we do
not ask if the specific 4-ounce limitation itself was required. For
whatever reason, that is the embodiment of its claim which Na-
tionwide chose. Having chosen that limitation, Nationwide is es-
topped from asking the Court to give it a broader coverage than it
chose for itself.246
The court relied on an earlier Seventh Circuit decision involving
a range limitation, Ekco Products:247
That case involved a product patent for a tin plate baking pan.
Ekco originally "had claimed its product broadly as a baking pan
having a steel base, an overlying layer of iron-tin alloy, a further
layer of metallic tin, and a surface layer of olive-green tin oxide.
244. Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 483 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.).
245. Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 584 F.2d at 718.
246. Id. at 718.
247. Ekeo Prods. Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 347 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1965).
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There had been no claim that called for any specific thickness of
iron-tin alloy." ... Ekco's claim was rejected, and it amended its
claim so it "was limited to pans in which the thickness of the iron-
tin alloy was 'approximately 10 to 15 micro-inches."' ... The
court noted that the only difference between Ekco's patented pan
and the prior art, which had a thicker alloy layer, was the
"approximately 10 or 15 micro-inches" thickness limita-
tion.... The purportedly infringing pan had an iron-tin alloy
somewhat thicker than that in Ekco's patent, but otherwise the pan
was identical to Ekco's.... The court held that because of the
doctrine of file wrapper estoppel, Ekco's patented pan was not in-
fringed. The court did not look at how close the thickness of the
purportedly infringing pan's alloy was to Ekco's, or whether Ekco
could have inserted a less restrictive thickness limitation when it
had amended its claim. Rather, the court "look(ed) no further than
to learn whether the patentee was forced to introduce such element
to avoid rejection." ... Where such is the case, the patentee "is
held strictly to the letter of the limited claims granted to
him..." ... See also Taylor-Reed Corp. v. Mennen Food Prod-
ucts, Inc., 324 F.2d 108, 111 (7th Cir. 1963); Aluminum Co. of
America v. Thompson Products, Inc., 122 F.2d 796, 800 (6th Cir.
1941) (chemical alloy patent employing 0.5% To 7% Nickel not
infringed by defendant's use of a nickel range of 0.04% To 0.45%,
where the field was crowded, and the minute percentages of nickel
used by defendant had no substantial effect upon the alloy); Saun-
ders v. Air-Flo Co., 435 F.Supp. 298, 305-306 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
We agree with the Seventh Circuit. Since Nationwide was forced
to introduce some dosage restriction, and chose the "less than 4
ounces per acre" restriction as the embodiment of its claim, we
look no further, and hold Nationwide "strictly to the letter of the
limited claims granted" to it. This case, as did Ekco, involves a
situation where the purportedly infringing process employed a
dosage that fell between the limitation in the patent in suit and the
prior art. Rather than reexamine the application to decide what in
that gap the Examiner might have allowed the patentee to claim,
we strictly limit the patentee to what he claimed. The Hunt-
Ziegler presumption ... that the patentee did not make a dis-
claimer "broader than necessary to yield to the actual challenge to
his claim," has no application in the present situation. 248
The court noted that "[t]he Hunt-Ziegler presumption does ap-
248. Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 584 F.2d at 718-19.
1998] THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR PATENTS 5'
ply in two different situations" 249:
In situations where the purported infringer falls on the other side
of the patent in suit from the prior art, the patent in suit may be
entitled to some slight range of equivalents. Thus, if Nationwide
had limited its claim to a dosage of 2 to 4 ounces, and Wright had
used 1 ounce, the Hunt-Ziegler presumption might apply and enti-
tle Nationwide to a limited range of equivalents below 2 ounces.
Cf Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971), affirming 307
F.Supp. 1251 (E.D. Mich. 1969) (where the prior art used a 15%
Cyanate bath, Kolene's patent employed "between about 25 and
40% Cyanate," and defendant used a 50% Cyanate bath, defendant
was held to have infringed for various reasons, including that the
Examiner had not required the maximum level to be inserted in
order to overcome the prior art).
The second situation where the Hunt-Ziegler presumption may ap-
ply is that exemplified by Ziegler itself, that is, situations where
the limitation in the claim was not inserted to overcome any prior
art. Thus, in Ziegler, Ziegler amended its patent claim for a cata-
lyst by adding the language, "essentially consisting of' two com-
ponents. This amendment was inserted to overcome the Exam-
iner's objection that the original claim was too broad and did not
disclose enough.... Phillips' catalyst was composed of three
components, including the two in Ziegler's claim. This Court held
that Phillips' catalyst infringed Ziegler's patent, using the doctrine
of equivalents. Since the Court found that there was nothing in the
file wrapper to indicate that third components were being ex-
cluded, nor any prior art references requiring such a dis-
claimer,... the Court held that Ziegler was not barred by the doc-
trine of file wrapper estoppel. It is in this context that Ziegler's
language that "an applicant should not be presumed to have made
a disclaimer broader than necessary to yield to the actual challenge
to his claim," ... must be understood.250
Interestingly, the first situation discussed in the above quotation
is virtually on all fours with the fact pattern in Warner-Jenkinson, i.e.
a numeric range limitation was added to distinguish a prior art refer-
ence on one side of the range and the accused product fell on the
other side of the range.
249. Id. at 719.
250. Id. at 719-20.
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b. Federal Circuit Decisions
Beginning shortly after its creation in 1982, the Federal Cir-
cuit developed two lines of authority on the scope of an estoppel
based on an amendment or argument based on prior art. One line of
authority indicated that an amendment does not preclude all equiva-
lence, and that the scope of an estoppel should be "determined in
light of the prior art that occasioned the change, as well as represen-
tations made to the patent examiner as to the reason for the
change."'' 1 The decision, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,22
rejected the approach of Nationwide and Ekco:
Some courts have expressed the view that virtually any amend-
ment of the claims creates a "file wrapper estoppel" effective to
bar all resort to the doctrine of equivalents, and to confime patentee
"strictly to the letter of the limited claims granted," Nationwide
Chemical Corp. v. Wright... We, as has the Supreme Court, re-
ject that view as a wooden application of estoppel. 53
Insituform24 is a recent example of the line of cases calling for
an analysis of cited prior art to determine what the patentee surren-
dered. The patent in suit concerned a process for repairing a cracked
underground pipe without digging up the pipe. 55 To impregnate a
felt layer in a tube inside the pipe with a resin, a resin slug is placed
in the tube. The tube is drawn through squeezing rollers. A vacuum
source is applied to assist in drawing the resin down the tube's
length. A prior art reference 56 taught that a single vacuum source
can be attached at the end opposite that containing the resin.257 The
patent claimed a method of applying a vacuum source at a window in
a section of the tube near the resin. After the section was impreg-
nated, the vacuum source was moved to another window along the
tube. The applicant's original claims required only that a vacuum be
applied "downstream of the resin mass."''  After a rejection based
251. Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
See also LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Conm'n, 867 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
252. ' Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983), later
appealed, 86 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996), vacated& remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1871 (1997).
253. Id. at 1362.
254. Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
255. Id. at 1102.
256. U.S. Patent 4,182,262.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1103.
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on the Everson reference, the applicant amended the claim to specify
that the vacuum be applied "through a window by means of a
cup... whereby the cup can move.., to a position spaced down-
stream." 259 The inventor argued the following:
Everson's method is ineffective when dealing with long lengths of
tube because that method requires an exceedingly large suction
compressor. Applicant's method solves the problem of impreg-
nating long lengths of tubing by forming a window in the tube's
impermeable skin, drawing the resin to the region of the window
by a vacuum while squeezing the tube to force the resin to flow
toward the evacuated region, sealing the window, and repeating
the process at another window, farther downstream. 260
The examiner allowed the claim. In an infringement suit, the
accused process used a continuous vacuum drawn through multiple
cups placed along the length of the tube. There was no literal in-
fringement because, properly interpreted, the patent claim was lim-
ited to "a process using only one vacuum cup which inherently cre-
ates a discontinuous vacuum."' 261 But the court held that estoppel did
not preclude an assertion of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents because "in light of the equivocal nature of [the pat-
entee's] statements, no reasonable competitor could conclude that
[the patentee] gave up coverage of continuous vacuum created by one
or more vacuum sources."
262
The prosecution history makes clear that the problem to be
solved was the need for a large compressor when the vacuum was
created a significant distance from the resin source. Either the use of
one vacuum source which is repeatedly moved down the tube as the
resin advances, or the use of a number of vacuum sources spread
along the tube so that one is always near the advancing resin, solve
the problem presented by Everson by placing the vacuum source
close to the resin, thereby allowing the use of a smaller vacuum
source.
At no point did [the patentee] indicate that the Everson problem
could be solved only in the manner used by [the patentee], i.e., [the
patentee] never stated that the problem could not be solved by us-
ing more than one vacuum source or a continuous vacuum.
259. Id. at 1103-4.
260. Id. at 1104.
261. Id. at 1106.
262. Id. at 1109.
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Rather, the only express limitation put on the invention by [the
patentee] was the use of a vacuum source close to the resin.263
A second line of cases followed a strict approach, refusing to
speculate whether a narrower amendment would have been al-
lowed.264 A recent example of this line of reasoning is Wang Labo-
ratories,265 in which the court emphasized that an estoppel applied,
even though the patentee could have chosen a different or narrower
basis for distinguishing prior art cited by the PTO. The patent
claimed a single in-line memory module in which there were nine
chips "in a single row. ' 266 During prosecution, the PTO examiner
had rejected the claims in view of a prior art reference which dis-
closed d memory chip with multiple rows of eight chips, the ninth
"parity" chip being located on a separate module.267 The applicant
amended the claim to add the "single row" limitation.26 In an in-
fringement suit, the accused devices had chips arranged in more than
a single ro w on a single module.269 The patentee argued that the
scope of any estoppel should not bar its equivalency theory because
the prior art distinguished during prosecution did not show a two-
row, single module structure. 270 The court disagreed:
While a two-row construction may not read on the prior art, [the
patentee] limited the scope of its claims to memory chips mounted
"only in a single row," and which argued before the PTO that [the
prior art reference] did not have memory chips mounted in a single
row.... Although [the reference] taught the advantage of locating
a parity chip on a separate module, [the patentee] did not limit its
claims to a single module. Instead, it chose a single row, which
excludes the accused devices.
2. -The Federal Circuit's Remand Order
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court did not address di-
rectly whether a flexible or rigid approach should be applied to es-
263. Id.
'264. Prodyne Enterprises, Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc., 743 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
265. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
266. -Id. at 862.
267. Id. at 861.
268. Id. at 862.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 867.
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toppel based on amendments relating to patentability over the prior
art. The opinion referred to estoppel as barring "application of the
doctrine [of] equivalents to the element added by that amend-
ment." 271 The Court cautioned that, in determining estoppel, a court
should not "review the correctness" of the PTO examiner's rejection,
but a court can "explore... the reason (right or wrong) for the ob-
jection and the manner in which the amendment addressed and
avoided the objection." 272  Reference to the "manner" of the
amendment hints that a court may indeed consider whether an
amendment leaves some room for equivalents of the limitation added,
for example, because the absence of written descriptive support
forced the patentee to withdraw from a generic claim to a highly spe-
cific claim.
After the Supreme Court remanded the Warner-Jenkinson case,
the Federal Circuit in a per curiam order further remanded the case to
the district court. The Remand Order did not discuss in detail the
question of the scope and effect of an estoppel created by an amend-
ment or an argument based on patentability, but it cited the Supreme
Court's opinion for the proposition that, in the event that there is a
"substantial reason related to patentability for including the limiting
element added by amendment," 273 "prosecution history estoppel
would bar the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to that
element (or claim limitation)." 274 Later, the Order noted that there
were two issues for resolution: the reason for an amendment, and
whether that reason is "sufficient to overcome estoppel." 275 The Or-
der indicated that "[i]f the district court determines that a reason not
related to patentability prompted an amendment, the court must then
decide if that reason is sufficient to overcome estoppel." 276
It can be argued strongly that the Federal Circuit's apparent
reading of Warner-Jenkinson as precluding all equivalency for a
claim element added by an amendment driven by the prior art is con-
trary to the Supreme Court's rejection of a "rigid" estoppel approach
and the Court's refusal to "change so substantially the rules of the
271. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1051 (1997).
272. Id. at 1051 n.7.
273. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Waner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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game" 277 as to "subvert the various balances the PTO sought to strike
when issuing the numerous patents which have not yet expired. ' 278
The flexible approach to estoppel is supported by a substantial body
of case law,279 none of which is mentioned in the Supreme Court's
opinion or the Remand Order.
H. Estoppel Created by Arguments
The Court in Warner-Jenkinson did address the related problem
on the scope of an estoppel concerning arguments by a patent appli-
cant to distinguish a cited prior art reference. Historically, many
courts declined to give estoppel effect to mere arguments on the
ground that to do so would be inconsistent with a patent's status as an
integrated legal document.20 The Federal Circuit has now extended
estoppel to arguments,21 however, this estoppel is applied in limited
situations. Some decisions stress that an estoppel based on argument,
as opposed to a "classic" estoppel based on claim amendments, will
arise only from an "unequivocal assertion" limiting claim scope in
relation to the prior art.282
Illogical consequences may arise if a court treats arguments un-
linked to specific claim language as an estoppel, but not as a dis-
claimer limiting the literal scope of a claim.2 3 Particular difficulties
arise when the patentee distinguishes cited prior art references on
-277. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1050 n.6. (1997).
278. l
279. See discussion infra Part lV[G][1][b], Federal Circuit Decisions.
280. Catalin Corp. of Am. v. Catalazuli Mfg. Co., 79 F.2d 593, 594 (2d Cir. 1935).
281. Townsend Eng'g Co. v. Hitec Co., Ltd., 829 F.2d 1086, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
("Prosecution history estoppel applies both 'to claim amendments to overcome rejections
based on prior art, and to arguments submitted to obtain the patent."').
282. Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Ath-
letic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
283. See, e.g., Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1993), which
held that a patent claim's "straw-shaped" phrase, properly interpreted, imposed a shape limi-
tation, requiring hollowness, but not a size limitation. The accused product, which used fine
(capillary-sized) fibers, escaped literal infringement because the fibers were solid, not hollow.
The court went on to conclude that the accused product escaped equivalency doctrine in-
fringement because of its size, the patentee being estopped from arguing equivalency of capil-
lary-sized elements. The court found "no inconsistency" between its conclusions on claim
interpretation and estoppel because the latter pertains to equivalency, which "operates outside
the literal language of claims." Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d at 950 n.6.
Under the court's analysis, fibers that were capillary-sized and hollow would infringe lit-
erally but would not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if they escaped the claim's lit-
eral terms for any reason, however unrelated to size.
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multiple grounds. In Read, a Federal Circuit panel emphasized that
"[e]very statement made by a patentee during prosecution to distin-
guish a prior art reference does not create a separate estoppel.1 2 4
Later panel decisions limit and distinguish Read,285 leaving the law in
a state of uncertainty.
. Procedure and Evidence for Determining Reasons for Claim
Amendments
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court indicated that there
was a presumption that a claim amendment was made for a reason
related to patentability but that a patentee could rebut the presump-
tion.286 The Supreme Court, however, did not discuss in detail what
procedures were to be used in determining the reason for an amend-
ment or what kinds of evidence could be admitted.
Two distinct approaches can be taken to resolve the procedure
and evidence problem. The first, an "intrinsic" evidence approach,
would limit the inquiry to the public record, which consists of the
prosecution history on file at the Patent and Trademark Office. The
second, an "extrinsic" evidence approach, would allow testimonial
evidence from the inventor, the inventor's patent attorney, and others,
as to the reasons for any claim amendment. The first approach is
supported by decisions holding that prosecution history estoppel is a
question of law. This position was confirmed by the Supreme Court
in Warner-Jenkinson in footnote 8 of the case, by decisions that re-
strict the use of "extrinsic" evidence including testimony by experts
and the inventor, to support a construction of the meaning of a patent
claim, and by the underlying public interest in clarity and certainty in
patent rights. 287 The second approach is supported by the Pall deci-
sion, which credited an inventor's testimony that claim limitations
were added not to distinguish the prior art but rather to restrict the
claims to that which had been established to be operable in experi-
284. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
285. Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Hoganas
AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The rule of Read v. Portec. .. 'any
estoppel created by an applicant's argument encompasses all of [the] combined distinctions'
over the cited references" does not apply when (1) the applicant distinguished a prior art refer-
ence on two grounds (size and percentage), (2) the first distinction (percentage) was "of ques-
tionable validity in terms of distinguishing [the reference]," and (c) the accused product does
not meet the second distinction (size).).
286. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem., 117 S. Ct. at 1051.
287. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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ments, and by the public interest in providing a fair scope of protec-
tion to inventors.28
In a concurring opinion in Warner-Jenkinson, Justice Ginsburg
expressed sympathy with the difficulties that owners of existing pat-
ents may face in establishing the reasons for amendments:
The new presumption, if applied woodenly, might in some in-
stances unfairly discount the expectations of a patentee who had
no notice at the time of patent prosecution that such a presumption
would apply. Such a patentee would have had little incentive to
insist that the reasons for all modifications be memorialized in the
file wrapper as they were made. Years after the fact, the patentee
may find it difficult to establish an evidentiary basis that would
overcome the new presumption. The Court's opinion is sensitive
to this problem, noting that "the PTO may have relied upon a
flexible rule of estoppel when deciding whether to ask for a
change" during patent prosecution.
Because respondent has not presented to this Court any explana-
tion for the addition of the lower pH limit, I concur in the decision
to remand the matter to the Federal Circuit. On remand, that court
can determine - bearing in mind the prior absence of clear rules
of the game - whether suitable reasons for including the lower
pH limit were earlier offered or, if not, whether they can now be
established.289
In its Remand Order, the Federal Circuit distinguished between
existing patents and those prosecuted after Warner-Jenkinson's rec-
ognition of a presumption.
[W]e expect that the PTO and applicants will henceforth usually
include in the prosecution history express statements of their rea-
sons for requiring or making claim changes or interpretive asser-
tions. Express recitations may not exist, however, in applications
prosecuted prior to the Supreme Court's decision. See Warner-
Jenkinson, 117 S.Ct. at 1055 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("Years
after the fact, the patentee may find it difficult to establish an evi-
dentiary basis that would overcome the new presumption.").
Thus, we conclude that where the prosecution history is silent or
unclear the district court should give a patentee the opportunity to
establish the reason, if any, for a claim change. See id. (urging the
288. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, 66 F.3d 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied 117 S.
Ct. 1243 (1997).
289. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem., 117 S. Ct. at 1055 (citations omitted).
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Federal Circuit to "bear in mind the prior absence of clear rules of
the game"). We hesitate to specify the procedures that the district
court can employ to answer the question posed by the newly cre-
ated presumption of prosecution history estoppel. The better
course is to allow the district court to use its discretion to decide
whether hearings are necessary or whether the issue can ade-
quately be determined on a written record.290
This solution to the procedure and evidence questions, when
coupled with the Federal Circuit's apparent position on the substan-
tive standards for estoppel, may well be the worst of all possible
worlds insofar as the Fair Protection - Certainty Conundrum is con-
cerned. As to substance, a rigid estoppel may be applied when an
amendment's reason is related to patentability, which seriously
threatens the fair protection interest. However, whether an estoppel
will apply when the reason is not so related depends on "the facts of
the case." This creates maximum incentive for the parties to a patent
dispute to assert and establish one reason or the other. With the Fed-
eral Circuit approving a patentee's right to establish a reason when
the written record is "silent or unclear," but declining to provide
guidance on procedures and evidence, the likely effect is obvious:
there will be an increase in uncertainty. Hence, there will be an in-
crease in the costs of studying and opining on patents, negotiating li-
censes, and litigating infringement charges, which seriously threatens
the certainty interest.
V. CONCLUSION
Some may criticize the Supreme Court's decision in Warner-
Jenkinson for its conservative response to what the Court acknowl-
edged to be legitimate concerns that the doctrine of equivalents had
acquired a life of its own, especially when coupled with patentee de-
mands for a trial of patent infringement charges by a lay jury. With-
out controls, the doctrine can undermine the careful limitations on the
scope of patent rights that result from the requirements of clear
claiming and examination by the Patent and Trademark Office. But,
a careful analysis of the Court's opinion reveals that it imposes im-
portant new limitations on the doctrine while at the same time pre-
serving the fundamental economic value of patents, which would be
290. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
62 COMPUTER & IItGHTECNOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 14
undermined by complete abolition of the doctrine. The overall theme
of the opinion is one of balance and accommodation of important and
not fully reconcilable interests.
So long as the patent system continues to require (1) compliance
with strict time limits and formalities for the filing of patent disclo-
sures of new technology, (2) formulation of verbal "claims" de-
scribing the technology, and (3) examination of such claims by the
patent office, all of which are conducted by fallible human beings
working with limited resources at a time when the commercial value
of the technology may be uncertain, the doctrine of equivalents will
remain an important safeguard to protect the substance of patent
rights. The public and competitors should be given clear notice of
how to design around the technology that a patent is intended to pro-
tect, not a license to design around the words that often only imper-
fectly describe the technology.
On the other hand, the courts can take reasonable measures to
reduce unnecessary uncertainty concerning patent claim scope that
may deter legitimate investment and business activities. The limita-
tions announced by the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson are
positive contributions to greater clarity, especially the threshold legal
requirement that a patentee's theory of equivalency shall not vitiate a
claim limitation or element by making it applicable to any substitu-
tion that achieves the same result. But, as the Court recognized, pri-
mary responsibility for achieving improvements in patent litigation
rests with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Nonetheless,
the Federal Circuit's June 12, 1997, Remand Order was not a prom-
ising start in its quest to implement the Supreme Court's directives.
However, the public interest in the patent system demands that
the judges of that court put to rest their past sharp differences on the
nature of the doctrine and on prosecution history estoppel in order to
focus their attention on refining the test for equivalence in the orderly
manner of case-by-case determinations.
